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ARTICLES
LAW ENFORCEMENT BY STEREOTYPES AND SERENDIPITY:
RACIAL PROFILING AND STOPS AND SEARCHES
WITHOUT CAUSE
David Rudovsky*
I. INTRODUCTION
On a summer evening in 1991, four young African-Americans
were driving on 1-95, returning to Delaware from a church service in
Philadelphia.' Although the driver had committed no traffic viola-
tions, the car was stopped just south of the Philadelphia International
Airport by police officers from Tinicum Township. The officers or-
dered the occupants out of the vehicle and proceeded to subject
them, and the vehicle, to an intrusive search that included the use of
a narcotics trained-police dog.3 They were detained for almost an
hour until the police were convinced that they were not transporting
drugs.4 To justify the initial stop, an officer issued a "warning" re-
garding an alleged obstruction of the car's windshield (a thin piece
of string hanging from the rear view mirror, which could not have
been observed by the officer before the stop).5 In response to a ques-
tion from one of the occupants of the car as to why they had been
stopped, the officer answered with surprising candor: "because you
are young, black and in a high drug-trafficking area, driving a nice
car."
6
David Rudovsky is a Senior Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. He is a
founding partner in Kairys, Rudovsky, Epstein, Messing & Rau. I am grateful for the comments
and suggestions provided by Seth Kreimer, Leonard Sosnov, Susan Herman, Paul Messing, Mi-
chael Avery and the members of the Legal Studies Workshop at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School. Susan Marcus provided excellent research assistance and David Rush was a re-
sourceful Journal editor. And a word of gratitude to my colleagues who have been litigating the
issues covered in this Article, with special thanks to Stefan Presser, Alan Yatvin, and Reginald
Shuford. Finally, by way of disclosure, I am counsel on some of the cases discussed in this arti-
cle.
Wilson v. Tinicum Township, No. Civ. A. 92-6617, 1993 WL 280205, at *2 (E.D. Pa.July 20,
1993) (Opinion on Class Action Certification).
2 Id.
Id.
4 Ann Stewart, Black Motorists Sue Police for Stopping Them on Highway, GANNETr NEWS
SERVICE, Nov. 19, 1992, available at 1992 WL 9397933.
5 See Wilson 1993 WL 280205, at *2.
6 Id. As to the officer's statement, see Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 298 (1999)
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On a summer afternoon in August 1998, U.S. Arm) Sergeant Ros-
sano Gerald and his young son Gregory were driving across Okla-
homa. A career soldier and highly decorated veteran of Desert
Storm, Gerald, a black man, was stopped tuice within thirty minutes.'
As a report on the incident noted, "[d]uring the second stop, which
lasted two-and-half hours, the troopers terrorized [Sergeant] Gerald's
12-year-old son with a police dog, placed both father and son in a
dosed car with the air conditioning off and fans blowing hot air, and
warned that the dog would attack if they attempted to escape."
As the district court described the allegations:
Over the course of the two hour detention the troopers repeatedly
searched the car, turning up nothing. Despite this, Trooper Perry re-
moved parts of the headliner, floorboards, carpet, and other areas, caus-
ing $1089.21 in damage to the car. Perry removed the passenger side
floorboard, claiming the bolts looked funny, like military bolts. Accord-
ing to the body shop that repaired the car, the bolts were the factory-
installed bolts. Throughout the search Perry and the second trooper ac-
cused Sergeant Gerald of running drugs and laundering money. Ser-
geant Gerald denied the allegations and informed the troopers that his
vehicle had recently passed inspection and had received military clear-
ance. He also informed the troopers that due to the nature of his as-
signment he is subject to random urinalysis and did not use drugs.
At approximately 3:45 p.m., the troopers ceased their detention and pre-
pared to let Plaintiffs leave with nothing but a wming ticket. WhIien Ser-
geant Gerald complained his car and lugage were a mess, Perry in-
formed him "We ain't good at repacking."'
On July 16, 1999, Alton Fitzgerald Wlite, a leading African-
American actor in the Broadway production of "Ragtime," was stand-
ing in the doonvay of his apartment building in Manhattan, when po-
lice arrived." He opened the door to allow them to enter.'2 He w%-as
immediately handcuffed and taken to the police district where he wvas
strip searched and held in a cell-all without probable cause-until
the police finally determined he had nothing to do with a call con-
cerning "Hispanic men" selling drugs from the apartment house."
Rather than being on stage, he found himself crying in a police hold-
ing cell, a circumstance dictated in no small part by the color of his
(suspect's admission made with "refreshing candor").
' Gerald v. Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety, CIV-99-676-R, slip op. at I (W.D. Okla. Dec. 2 1.
1999); ACLU, DRvNG WHILE BLCK: RACLAL PROFILING ON OUR N.ATION's HIt~il%, %S 3 (1999)
[hereinafter ACLU REPORT]; Kevin Johnson, ACLU Campaign Ildds Rare Bias Suit USA TOD.
May 19, 1999, at4A.
ACLU REPORT, supra note 7;Johnson, supra note 7.
ACLU REPORT, supra note 7.10 Gerad, slip op. at 6.
1 Bob Herbert, InAmeiria Attention Must be Paid, N.Y TIES, Sept. 30. 1999, at A29:; Dinitia
Smith, Actor Resumes RoleAfter OrdwI N.Y. TIMEs.Julv 22. 1999, at B3.
12 Smith, supra note 11.
is Id.
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14
In 1997, Janneral Denson, an African-American woman returning
from Jamaica to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, was pulled out of the arri-
val line by a U.S. Customs agent, taken to a local hospital, handcuffed
to a bed rail and forced to drink four cups of a laxative." She pro-
tested that she was not carrying drugs and was seven months preg-
nant. 6 Over twenty-four hours after her detention, when her bowels
showed no sign of drugs, she was released.' 7 Eight days later, after se-
vere diarrhea and bleeding, she underwent an emergency Caesar-
ean.'8 Her son was born weighing three pounds, four ounces.'9 In a
similar incident, Amanda Buritica was held for twenty-five hours, sub-
jected to a full strip search, x-rays, and forced to swallow laxatives in
what she termed was "the most degrading, humiliating thing I have
been through.
20
In June of 1998, Curtis Rodriguez, a Latino attorney, was driving
on Highway 152 near San Jose, California, and observed five traffic
stops by state police, all of Latino drivers.2 ' He stopped to take pho-
tographs of two of these stops and was then followed and stopped by
the state highway officers. When Rodriguez refused consent to
search his car, the officer replied "I am in fear for my life," and pro-. 2 21
ceeded to search the vehicle. 3 No contraband was found.
These incidents-stops, searches, and arrests without cause and of
persons of color based on their race-are repeated thousands of
times every year throughout the United States, and in too many in-
stances reflect official police policy or practice. The "driving while
black" phenomenon has been the subject of much scholarly and
popular analysis, but for the most part these accounts of racial profil-
ing have focused on highway stops and searches and have not ad-
dressed the role that race plays in pedestrian stop and frisk prac-
tices.2 Moreover, while there is substantial commentary regarding
14 Id.
15 Stephen Barr, Two Allege Racial Bias by Customs, WASH. POST, May 21, 1999,A29.
16 id.
17 id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Gary Webb, DWB, EsQUIRE, Apr. 1999, at 120; see also Rodriguez v. California Highway Pa-
trol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (addressing the litigation that resulted from these
events).
22 Webb, supra note 21, at 120.
23 Id.
24 l.
25 See, e.g., DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 34-41 (1999) (discussing pretextual traffic stops of minority motorists); ACLU
REPORT, supra note 7 (reporting on the problem of racial profiling during highway traffic
stops); AngelaJ. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997) (discussing
the discretionary nature of pretextual traffic stops and their discriminatory effect on minority
motorists); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court
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the Fourth Amendment standards that govern stop and frisk prac-
tices,26 almost no attention has been given to the question of stops
and frisks conducted without legal justification, independent from
racial profiling concerns. Even if we could eliminate racial bias in
street level policing, the problem of arbitrary stops and searches
would still be present. Empirical studies demonstrate that while
there is substantial operational and doctrinal overlap, the dual prob-
lems of racial profiling and stops and searches without adequate
cause deserve separate consideration.2
Consider the following recent studies:
In NewJersey, litigation and governmental investigations concern-
ing allegations of racial profiling on the NewJersey Turnpike provide
comprehensive and compelling data demonstrating a long standing
and Preteztual Traffic Stops, 87J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997) [hereinafter Harris. Driving
Wile Black] (discussing the effects of IIren v. United Stats on pretextual traffic stops); Daiid A.
Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: l17iy "Driving Wile Black" Mattns 84 MiNN. L RE,.
265 (1999) [hereinafter Harris, The Stories] (discussing the experiences of African-.Mnerican
drivers who were stopped for pretextual traffic violations); Sheri Lynn Johnson. Rate and the
Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE LJ. 214 (1983) (discussing the interplay between the deter-
mination of probable cause and race); Christo Lassiter, Eliminating Consent from the Lexicon of
Traffic Stop Interogations, 27 CAP. U. L RE%. 79 (1998) (discussing the validity of consent inter-
rogations that occur after a traffic stop in the state of Ohio); Tracey Maclin. Race mid the Fourth
Amendment, 51 VAND. L REV. 333 (1998) [hereafter Maclin, Race] (discussing the role of race
during prete-xual traffic stops); Reginald T. Shuford, Anya, You Slicet It. lq Racial Profiling i
IVng; 18 ST. Louis U. PuB. L RE%,. 371 (1999); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minorty Molor-
ists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment 1997 Sup. CT. RE%. 271 (discussing the effect of traffic
stops of minority motorists on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Anthony C. Thompson,
Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendmenn4 74 N.Y.U. L REV. 956 (1999) (discuss-
ing the constitutional and policy implications of racially motivated searches and seizures);Jen-
nifer A. Larrabee, Note, "D10 (Driving II7dle Black)" and Equal Protection: The Realitits of an Un-
constitutionalPolicePracticA 6J.L & PoL'Y 291 (1997) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment should bar the consideration of race when police decide who to
detain for a traffic violation); Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Thirfren Mlls of Loohng at A B!ack Man,
THE NE% YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 56, 58-59 (discussing "war stories" of famous African-
American men stopped by police).
Courts have also addressed the issue. For example, the Ninth Circuit described a series of
stops of African-American celebrities:
The police ... erroneously stopped businessman and former Los Angeles Laker star Ja-
maal Wilkes in his car and handcuffed him, and stopped 1984 Olympic medalist Al Joy-
ner twice in the space of twenty minutes, and once forcing him out of his car, handcuff-
ing him and making him to lie spread-eagled on the ground at gunpoint. Similarly,
actor Wesley Snipes was taken from his car at gunpoint, handcuffed, and forced to lie on
the ground while a policeman kneeled on his neck and held a gun to his head. Actor
Blair Underwood was also stopped in his car and detained at gunpoint. We do not know
exactly how often this happens to African-American men and women who are not celeb-
rities and whose brushes with the police are not deemed newsw3orthy.
Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1182, n.2 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). See abo,
Price v. Kramer 200 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000) (sustaining award of $245,000 to tuo Atri-
can-Americans stopped and abused by police).
26 See infra notes 122-145 and accompanying text.
I use the term racial profiling to mean any stop, search, or arrest of a person based in
whole or in part on the race of the suspect, except where police are acting on a racial descrip-
tion of the perpetrator of a crime. Arbitrary stops, searches, or arrests refer to police itestiga-
tory practices without the requisite cause or suspicion required by the Fourth .mendment.
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pattern of racial profiling. In criminal litigation arising from drug ar-
rests on the Turnpike, a court found substantial evidence that stops
and searches on the Turnpike were highly disproportionate based on
race.2 8 The court determined that approximately 15% of all drivers
on the Turnpike were minorities, that virtually all drivers violated the
traffic laws (and in particular for speeding), and that blacks and
whites violated traffic laws at almost exactly the same rate, but that
42% of stops and 73.2% of arrests were of blacks motorists, resulting
in respective disparities of 16.35 and 54.2 standard deviations'" Fur-
ther, the court found that while radar stops were relatively consistent
with the percentage of minority violators, discretionary stops (made
by patrol officers involved in drug interdiction) resulted in double
the number of stops of minorities. Of all stops resulting in the issu-
ance of a traffic citation, 88% involved cars with a minority driver or
3Ipassenger and 63% involved a black male 30 years or younger.
A study conducted by the Attorney General of New Jersey con-
firmed and expanded upon these findings. The Attorney General
determined that searches of cars on the Turnpike were even more ra-
cially disparate than the initial stops: 77.2% of all "consent" searches
were of minorities and blacks. The Attorney General concluded
that the use of arrest statistics could not justify racially disparate stops
and searches, as those arrests were the product of racially discrimina-
tory law enforcement practices.33
In Volusia County, Florida, where Sheriffs cars were fitted with
video cameras that recorded routine traffic stops, 148 hours of video-
tape documenting over 1,000 stops of cars on a stretch of 1-95 where
5% of the drivers were African-American or Latino, revealed that
nearly 70% of the persons stopped by the police were minorities."
In Illinois, the state police initiated a drug interdiction program
("Operation Valkyrie") in which they used aggressive enforcement of
traffic laws on interstates to stop motorists and then examine them
and their cars for indicators of drug trafficking.35 A statistical study of
the racial impact of these stops on Hispanic drivers showed the fol-
28 State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 360 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (noting that the statistical
disparities between African-American and white motorists stopped for traffic offenses were
"stark").
Id. at 352-55; Harris, The Stories, supra note 25, at 278-90.
" Soto, 734 A.2d at 354.
S1 Id. at 356.
32 PETER VERNIERO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY, INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE
POLICE REVIEW TEAM REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 26-28 (Apr. 20, 1999),
available at http://v.state.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT OF
ATrORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY].
33 Id. at 67-68.
34 Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Color of Drivers is Key to Stops on 1-95 Videos, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Aui, 23, 1992, at A-i; Harris, Driving Wile Black, supra note 25, at 561-62.
ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 27.
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lowing.
36
While Hispanics comprise less than 8% of the Illinois population,
and take fewer than 3% of the personal vehicle trips in Illinois, they
comprise approximately 30% of the motorists stopped by drug inter-
diction officers for discretionary offenses such as failure to signal a
lane change or driving one to four miles over the speed limit.v'
Troopers assigned to Valkyrie teams stop Hispanic motorists for
traffic violations two or three times more frequently than other
troopers patrolling the same highways and charged with enforcing
the same laws.s For example, in three counties in northern Illinois,
where Hispanics comprise less than 3% of the local driving-age popu-
lation, Hispanics make up 25% of the persons stopped by Valkyrie of-
ficers, while the rate for non-Valkyrie officers is 8%.
While Hispanics compromise 27% of the searches conducted by
Valkyrie officers, troopers find contraband in a lower percentage of
the vehicles of Hispanic motorists than in the vehicles of white motor-
ists.
40
Statistical studies conducted of car and pedestrian stops in Phila-
delphia also demonstrate patterns of stops wthout cause and racial
profiling.4' For a one-week period in July, 1999, for car and pedes-
trian stops made in predominantly white police districts, the ratio of
African-Americans who were stopped wras up to ten times higher than
one would expect from population data.12 In predominantly minority
police districts, stops were closely aligned to population data.f Fur-
ther, one-third of all pedestrian stops were made without sufficient
written explanation."
S6 I& The statistical evidence is set forth in Plaintiffs' Experts' Reports. CI/ar- it. lllmms Slate
Pore, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (No. 94 C 5307) (on file with atuthor.
37 ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 27.
S IM at28.
is "
4 Id. at 27-28. In the highway drug interdiction field, a little known federal program. 'Op-
eration Pipeline," financed by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEAl and administered bv osver
300 state and local law enforcement agencies, has had substantial influence on profiling prac-
tices. GaryWebb, D1V, ESQUIRE, Apr. 1999, at 118. The DEA has trained thomwands of officers
in drug interdiction practices that rely heavily on pretextual traffic stops of 'stspicious" seli-
des. Id. at 123-24. This "volume" approach to law enforcement sweeps an ovenlthning num-
ber of innocent drivers. In 1997, the California Highway Patrol stopped 3-.000 cars and ulti-
mately seized contraband in 2% of these stops. Id. at 122. As one California Higlmas Patrol
sergeant explained, "[i]t's sheer numbers .... Our gus make a lot of stops. You'e got to kiss a
lot of frogs before you find a prince." Id.
41 Plaintiffs' Fourth Monitoring Report, Pedestrian and Car Stop Audit. NAACP s. Cits of
Philadelphia, CA No. 96-CV-6045 (E.D. Pa. July, 1998) [hereinafter Fourth Philadelphia Re-
port]; Plaintiffs' Fifth Monitoring Report, Pedestrian and Car Stop Audit. NAACP s. Citv of
Philadelphia, CA. No. 96-CV-6045 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7. 2000) [hereinafter Fifth Philadelphia Re-
port].
Fifth Philadelphia Report, supra note 41, at 9-10. 22-26.
4 Id. at 20-25.
4 Id. at 13-14.
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In Ohio, a study of the traffic ticketing of several police depart-
ments demonstrated that African-Americans were two to three times
more likely to receive traffic tickets than their white counterparts.'
The Attorney General of New York conducted a study of 175,000
pedestrian stops by the New York City Police Department and found
a highly disproportionate rate of stops of minorities.'6 The Attorney
General determined that (1) African-Americans were stopped six
times more frequentiy than whites, 7 (2) in precincts with a white
population of 80% or more and where African-Americans constitute
10% or less of the population, stops of African-Americans comprised
30% of all stops, more than ten times their percentage of the popula-
tion, 8 (3) stops of African-Americans were less likely to result in ar-
rests than stops of whites,49 and (4) adjusting for crime rates by race,
the differences in stops of minorities compared to stops of whites is
statistically significant, with African-Americans stopped twice as oftenas whites.5°
The Attorney General also reported that where a full factual
statement concerning the stop was provided by the police, 15.4% of
the stops failed to comply with Fourth Amendment standards.' In
addition, 23.5% of the stops failed to provide a sufficient factual basis,
on their face, to determine whether the stop was constitutionally
proper. Stops by the elite "Street Crime Unit" (that was involved in
the death of Amadou Diallo) 53 based on suspicion of possession of a
weapon, yielded a weapon in only 2.5% of all stops. 4
The Massachusetts Attorney General investigated claims of racial
bias and illegal stops in Boston and reported:
We conclude that Boston police officers engaged in improper, and un-
constitutional, conduct in the 1989-90 period with respect to stops and
searches of minority individuals .... Although we cannot say with preci-
sion how widespread this illegal conduct was we believe that it was suffi-
ciently common to justify changes in certain Department practices.
Perhaps the most disturbing evidence was that the scope of a number of
Tery searches went far beyond anything authorized by that case and in-
45 Harris, The Stories, supra note 25, at 281-88.
46 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK STATE, REPORT ON THE NEW YORK CiTy
POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP & FRISK" PRAGrICES 88-89 (1999), available at http://www.oag.
state.ny.us/press/reports/stop frisk/stopfrisk.html [hereinafter REPORT OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF NEw YORK].
47 Id. at 95.
48 Id. at 105-06.
49 Id. at 111.
Id. at 121,126.
51 Id. at 160-62
,2 Id. at 162-64.
53 Amadou Diallo was shot and killed on February 4, 1999 when four officers mistook a wal-
let he as holding for a gun and fired 41 shots at him. The officers were acquitted of criminal
charges in February, 2000. See infra notes 223-225 and accompanying text.
54 REPORT OFATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEWYORK, supra note 46, at 117 n.23.
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deed, beyond anything that we believe would be acceptable under the
federal and state constitutions even where probable cause existed to con-
duct a full search incident to an arrest. Forcing young men to lower their
trousers, or otherwise searching inside their underwear, on public streets
or in public hallways, is so demeaning and invasive of fundamentl pre-
cepts of privacy that it can only be condemned in the strongest terms.
The fact that not only the young men themselves, but independent it-
nesses complained of strip searches, should be deeply alarming to all
members of this community.5
Stops and searches by customs officials also disclose racial bias. In
1998, there were approximately 52,000 people selected for body
searches (ranging from hand frisks to strip and cavity searches) by
customs officials. No contraband was found in 96% of these
searches and almost half of all persons selected for search were Afri-
can-American or Latino. 7 Further in 1998, black women were nine
times more likely than white women to be subjected to x-rays, yet they
were less than half as likely to be found carr)ing contraband as their
white counterparts.53
The powerful combination of governmental investigations, judi-
cial findings, anecdotal evidence, and statements by law enforcement
officials leave little doubt about the existence of racial profiling and
other stops without cause. 9 In December, 1999, a Gallup poll found
that 56% of whites and 77% of blacks believe racial profiling to be
videspread.6 Almost three-quarters of all young black men polled
believed that they had been stopped based on their race. ' In June,
1999, President Clinton condemned this practice as "morally inde-
fensible" and requested record-keeping and studies to determine the
extent of racial profiling in law enforcement!"
JANMEs M. SHANNON,, AT-ORNEY GENERAL OF NUMACHUSETTS, REPORT OF THE ArroT"RNY
GENERAL'S CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION ON BOSTON POUlcE DEPARTM.SENT PRACrCES 6,-61 (Dec. 18,
1990).
U.S. GENERAL AccOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE: BETrER TARGETING OF
AIRLINE PASSENGERS FOR PERSONAL SEARCHES COULD PRODUcE BETTER RESULTS 2, 40 (Mar.,
2000). See also, Anderson v. Cornejo, No. 97 C 7556, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 519 (N.D. Il. Jan.
11, 1999) (denying class certification of African-American women who claimed that they were
improperly searched when going through customs at O'Hare International Airport).
-UNITED STATES GENERALACCOUNING OFFICE, supra note 56, at 40.
rs Id. at 2.
59 E.g., Lassiter, supra note 25, at 115-19 (listing studies, newspaper articles, and reports).
For additional data, see Tanya Albert, ChiefAdmowlalges Racal Profiling, CINCI.N-,LTt E.NQUIRER.
Feb. 1, 2000, at 1; Barbara Whitaker, San Diego Police Found to Stop Blaek mid Latino Dmr ,1oal,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2000, § 1, at A31.
60 Will Lester, Americans Think Racial Stops are I17despread, PHIL. INQUIRER, Dec. 11, 1999 at
A14. In a survey of Philadelphia residents, the Pew Center for CitlJournalism found that 60%
of whites, but only 39% of blacks believed that the police 'treat everyone the same." Chris
Brennan, Crime is a Local Conciz, PHIL. DAiLY NEws, Feb. 11, 2000. at 12.
61 Lester, supra note 60.
E.g.,Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. TIMEsJune 20, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at
51. On January 17, 2000, Democratic Presidential candidates Al Gore and Bill Bradley prom-
ised to end racial profiling if elected as President. Exrqts From Bradl')-,ore Detate in Des Mnies,
N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 18, 2000, at A20.
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It may seem curious that the President would have to order fed-
eral law enforcement agencies to collect and analyze data on the ra-
cial characteristics of stops and searches. After all, law enforcement
places heavy reliance on car and pedestrian stops as part of proactive,
order-maintenance policing,s and the courts have vested broad dis-
cretion in the police in these areas. 64 Further, police and prosecuto-
rial agencies maintain comprehensive data on reported crime, arrests
and convictions, with specific documentation concerning race.6
The failure of most law enforcement agencies to collect and ana-
lyze data concerning car and pedestrian stops, or to conduct com-
prehensive reviews of the legality of stops and searches-as to both
racial profiling and stop and searches made without cause, regardless
of race-has undermined efforts to make sound empirical judg-
ments. Many police agencies have authorized or tolerated racial pro-
filing and random, suspicionless stops and searches, as part of polic-
ing programs that operate on the theory that the more stops and
searches that are conducted, whether in compliance with the Consti-
tution or not, more drugs, weapons, and intelligence will be se-
cured.66 Law enforcement is well aware that it is far easier to discount
anecdotal evidence of constitutional violations than it is to rebut sta-
tistical data that reflect entrenched patterns of unlawful practices. 7
Without hard data to prove that racial profiling and random stops
are integral parts of street level policing, the police have every reason
to be confident that if an improper stop is made there will likely not
be any negative consequences. If contraband is recovered, it will be
confiscated regardless of the legality of the stop or search. Moreover,
factual assertions sufficient to justify the stop and search can be cre-
See infra notes 64 and 76 and accompanying text.64 For commentary on community policing, police discretion, and constitutional limits, see
David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice Schol-
arship, 87 CEO. L.J. 1059 (1999) (discussing legal scholarship supporting police discretion); Dan
M. Kahan & Tracy L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998)
(discussing the constitutional scrutiny used to evaluate community policing); Debra Livingston,
Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities and the New Policing 97
COLUM. L. REv. 551 (1997) (critiquing police discretion in community policing); Tracey
Maclin, What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn From Vagueness Doctrine?, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
399 (2001); Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-
Maintenance Policing 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999) (arguing that order-
maintenance policing can reinforce racist presumptions regarding the criminal behavior of mi-
norities).
65 E.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS- 1997 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1997). Moreover, with the
increase of "hate-crime" legislation, law enforcement officials must analyze certain criminal
conduct from the perspective of race and must keep records that reflect the race (and other
statutorily covered characteristics) of victims and alleged offenders.
6 See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
67 For an interesting analysis of the ways in which the courts and other institutions have
avoided confronting institutional patterns of misconduct by reducing evidence to anecdotes,
see Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Court4 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1307-09
(1999).
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ated to avoid the exclusionary rule or other sanctions. Even if noth-
ing is found, the person stopped is highly unlikely to pursue any ad-
ministrative or legal remedies.' " To the degree that empirical evi-
dence undermines these claims, law enforcement's broad
discretionary powers and the practice of stopping as many cars and
pedestrians as possible are placed in some jeopardy.
Police officials have fought legislative initiatives that would require
record-keeping regarding the racial characteristics of police stops and
searches.69 Out of twenty states in which legislation has been drafted
that would require data collection and analysis, only five have im-
posed these requirements. On the federal level, the House of Rep-
resentatives passed the Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 1998,
authorizing the collection and analysis of information relating to the
age, race, and ethnicity of drivers stopped by the police." Law en-
forcement agencies lobbied hard against dis legislation, asserting
that the data would be misused or misinterpreted and would ad-
versely affect law enforcement. , The bill failed to gain Senate ap-
See infra notes 359-361 and accompanying text.
69 Kevin Johnson & Gary Fields, Police Cdiefs Resist Raet.Relatd Tallie, USA TODAY, Apr. 8.
1999, at 7A, Robert L Jackson, Push Against Bias in Traffic Stops Arrestd, LA. TIMES. June 1,
1998, at A5.
10 See ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 39-40; Harris, The Stones, supra note 25. at 321-22.
Currently, Missouri, Connecticut, North Carolina, Washington, and Kansas require data collec-
tion. See supra note 70.
71 H.R. 118, 105th Cong. § 1 (1998). The Act provided that:
The Attorney General shall conduct a study of stops for routine traffic violations by law
enforcement officers. Such study shall include collection and analsis of appropriate
available data. The study shall include consideration of the follotung factors, among
others:
(1) The number of individuals stopped for routine traffic violations.
(2) Identil)ing characteristics of the individual stopped, including the race and or eth.
nicity as well as the approximate age of that individual.
(3) The traffic infractions alleged to have been committed that led to die stop.
(4) Whether a search was instituted as a result of the stop.
(5) How the search was instituted.
(6) The rationale for the search.
(7) Whether any contraband was discovered in the course of the search.
(8) The nature of such contraband.
(9) Whether any warning or citation ias issued as a result of the stop.
(10) Whether an arrest was made as a result of either tie stop or tie search.
(11) The benefit of traffic stops ith regard to the interdiction of drugs and the pro-
ceeds of drug trafficking, including the approximate quantity of drugs ad %nlue of drug
, roceeds seized on an annual basis as a result of routine traffic stops.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text. In 1999 the International Association of Chiefs
of Police ("IACP") announced its opposition to -proactive traffic enforcement tlt is race or
ethnic-based," but defined such activity as stops and searches made "simplv because of race,"
and refused to endorse federal legislation requiring maintenance of daa on these pracuces.
IACP, Recommendations from the First IACP Forum on Professional Traffic Stops 2-8 (Apr. 6,
1999) (on file with author). The IACP recommended -voluntary. local efforts to collect data
on traffic stops. Id. at 7-8. At a conference called by the Attorney General of die United States.
"Strengthening Police-Community Relationships" in June 1999, several police officias opposed
data collection regarding racial characteristics of car stops, expressing concerns about cost. ofit-
cer integrity in collecting the data, "legal questions" concerning asking drivers questions about
race, and use of the data in performance and other officer evaluiations. U.S. DEP'T OFJtSTcE,
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proval' 3
The systematic collection and analysis of data pertaining to police
stops and searches, including the often ignored pedestrian stops,7 1 is
an essential component of any long term reforms of these practices.
However, the fact that all police departments do not maintain this
data cannot excuse law enforcement agencies or the courts from ex-
ercising their powers to remedy current unlawful or misinformed
policies. Studies and litigation consistently demonstrate significant
racial disparities and the failure to act cannot be rationalized on a
"lack of data" theory. Unfortunately, while we might expect that"morally indefensible" 75 and "deeply corrosive" practices would be
taken seriously by governmental agencies and the courts, experience
to date does not meet that expectation.
To explore these issues, this article considers the legal and social
ramifications of racial profiling and random police stops and
searches. In Part II, I discuss the justifications provided for the con-
tinued disparate treatment of African-Americans and other racial mi-
norities in drug, weapons, and quality of life law enforcement. In
Part III, I review the relevant federal constitutional and statutory law,
including Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standards, as it applies
to the different policing practices involved in car and pedestrian
stops. Part IV presents an analysis of the remedial framework. In
Part V, I recommend legislative, administrative, and judicial reforms.
II. RACIAL PROFILING: THE LAW ENFORCEMENTJUSTIFICATIONS
The debate over racial profiling has shifted ground. Virtually eve-
ryone agrees that it is impermissible to stop or search someone solely
on the basis of race. However, the extent and pervasiveness of this
practice is sharply disputed. While there has been a movement to-
wards exclusion of race as a legitimate factor in any police stop or
SUMMARY REPORT OF ATFORNEY GENERAL'S CONFERENCE: STRENGTHENING POLICE-CONUNIUNTry
RELATIONSHIPS 35 (June 1999) (on file with author).
The Department ofJustice currently supports collection and maintenance of this data, but
for many years declined the authority to do so. See Peter L. Davis, Rodney King and the Decrimi-
nalization of Police Brutality in America: Direct andJudidal Access to the GrandJury as Remedies for Vic-
tints of Police Brutality when the Prosecutor Declines to Prosecute, 53 MD. L. REv. 271, 274 n.4 (1994)
(noting that the Justice Department, while conducting a study of police brutality on its own,
had previously opposed legislation requiring similar studies because of fears that such measures
would hamper efforts to improve local police agencies).
7, Harris, The Stories, supra, note 25, at 276; Alan Jenkins, See No Evi4 THE NATION, June 28,
1999, at 15. On March 1, 2000, the HouseJudiciary Committee approved an updated version of
the racial profiling legislation. 146 CONG. REC. H 930 (2000); H.R. 1443, 106th Cong. § 1
(1999). See also, Hearing on S. 821, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999), Subcommittee on Constitution,
Federalism, and Property Rights, 146 CONG. REC. D292 (2000).
74 While most of the recent attention has focused on the "driving while black" phenomenon,
racial bias in pedestrian stops, and the problem of random stops regardless of race present
equally serious challenges. See infra Part III.
75 See supra text accompanying note 62.
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search, unless in response to a description of a suspect, man) law en-
forcement officials and courts continue to assert that race is a legiti-
mate factor in policing decisions, even where there is no specific ra-
cial description of a suspect. The racially disparate impact of police
practices are defended on a number of grounds: (1) that minorities
commit more crime than whites, which explains and justifies, at least
in part, the racial disparities that appear in data concerning stops,
searches, and arrests; (2) that enforcement of criminal laws that are
violated by whites and minorities in roughly proportionate numbers
is disproportionate as to minorities because the location and social
impact of the same types of crimes justifies a more aggressive re-
sponse in minority communities; and (3) that current practices work:
aggressive policing and targeting of minority communities, with in-
creased numbers of pedestrian and car stops and searches, has led to
a significant number of seizures of contraband, weapons, and fugi-
tives, and a reduction of crime.i
7The debates over "broken window" theories, zero tolerance of -quality of life" crimes,
drug enforcement policies and aggressive patrol tactics reveal deep philosophical and opera-
tional divides. On the policing practices, see, for example WiLLM.i BR.rroN & PETER
KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: How AMERICA'S Top Cop REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC (1998) (diS-
cussing Bratton's role in reducing crime as New York City's Police Commissioner); RUNDALL
KENNEDY, RAcE, CRIME, AND THE LAW, 138-63 (1998) (discussing police use of race as an indica-
tion of increased risk of criminality); Robert C. Ellickson. Controling Crom ,Miondud a City
Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YMLE LJ. 1163. 1168-69 (1996)
(discussing the history and legal responses to chronic street nuisances);Judith A. Greene, Zero
Tolerance: A Case Study of Police Policies and Practices in Neu' Yod, City, 45 CRIME & DEIJNQ. 171
(1999) (discussing the policing practices introduced in New York City by police commissioner
William Bratton); Bernard E. Harcourt, Re/lZaing on the Subjrr: A Critique of the S!ial Influence
Conceptin of Deterrene the Broken Windows Theoy, and Order-Maintrnance Pohing Ve, York Stl 97
MicH. L. REv. 291 (1998) (using empirical data to critique New York City's quality-of.life initia-
tive); Symposium, Why is Crime Dccresing? 88J. CmM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 1173 (1998); Fox But-
terfield, Rethinking the StrongArm of the Law, N.Y. TiEs. Apr. 4, 1999, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1
(promoting community policing as an alternative to the zero tolerance approach taken in New
York City); Michael Massing, The Blue Retvolution, NEv YORK REvEV OF BOOKS, Nov. 19. 1998. at
32 (reviewing several books discussing crime and the application of the broken uindows the-
ory);James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken indoaws: The Pohe and Xghborhwd Safey,
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982 (discussing police foot patrols and other efforts to improve
community policing).
Claims that aggressive policing, including pretextual car stops, stop and frisks of pedestri-
ans, and zero tolerance of low level criminal conduct have caused a reduction in crime are
much disputed. For the proponents' view, see BRA'TrON & KNOIBLER supra Greene, supra. See
also Wiliam J. Bratton, Iiy Lowering Crime Didn't Raise Trust, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2000, at A19
(suggesting that the reduction in crime rates in New York City was the result of assertive polic-
ing strategies). Critics of this view dispute the effectiveness, necessity and legality of these prac-
tices. E-g., Harcourt, supra; COLE, supra note 25; Fox Butterfield, Ctie Rrduer Cnr.e and Conflzt
ithout New York-Style Hardball N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2000, at Al (comparing crime reduction
rates by city and types of policing and reporting more reductions in "conmunity oriented" po-
licing in San Diego than in New York City); Roberts. supra note 64, at 811 ("In the same way
that minor infractions of order... can allegedly lead to serious crime, minor infringements of
citizens' liberties can cause serious damage to the relationship between government and the
governed .... ). Indeed, if the broken windows theory is correct, it is fair to ask why police of-
ficials who advocate order-maintenance policing as the uay to effectuate this theory are not
equally vigilant in attempting to end low level abuses of citizens by police to prexvnt the more
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As stated by one commentator, based on his interviews with and
observations of police officers:
This is what a cop might tell you in a moment of reckless candor: in
crime fighting, race matters. When asked, most cops will declare them-
selves color blind. But watch them on the job for several months, and get
them talking about the way policing is really done, and the truth will
emerge, the truth being that cops, white and black, profile .... [They
say] African-Americans commit a disproportionate percentage of the
types of crimes that draw the attention of the police. Blacks make up 12
percent of the population, but accounted for 58 percent of all carjackers
between 1992 and 1996. (Whites accounted for 19 percent.) Victim sur-
veys-and most victims of black criminals are black-indicate that blacks
commit almost 50 percent of all robberies. Blacks and Hispanics are
widely believed to be the blue-collar backbone of the country's heroin-
and cocaine-distribution networks. Black males between the ages of 14
and 24 make up 1.1 percent of the country's population, yet commit
more than 28 percent of its homicides. Reason, not racism, cops say, di-
rects their attention.
Cops, white and black, know one other thing: they're not the only ones
who profile. Civilians profile all the time-when they buy a house, or
pick a school district, or walk down the street."
These observations reflect widely held views-within and without
law enforcement circles-that African-Americans and other minori-
ties commit a disproportionate number of crimes and, therefore, they
are justifiably targeted not only where race is part of a reported
criminal incident, but also in situations where police have a wide
range of possible targets (e.g., pretextual traffic stops) or where their
suspicion of criminal activity would not otherwise justify a stop or
search.7 8
In the context of drug interdiction car stops, these defenses of ra-
cial profiling do not withstand empirical and legal scrutiny.7" First,
serious abuses that will surely follow under this theory of human behavior.
77
7 Goldberg, supra note 62, at 51.78 SeeThompson, supra note 25, at 999 (discussing the view in DINESH D'SOUSA, THE END OF
RAcIsM, PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY 284 (1995), that using race as a proxy for sus-
picion may be a form of "rational discrimination"); KENNEDY, supra note 76, at 145 (acknowl-
edging higher crime rates among African-Americans, but strongly condemning use of race in
determining suspicion). It is important to analyze the data concerning crime and arrest rates,
by type of crime and reporting systems. Thus, while arrest records and victimization studies
demonstrate that blacks commit more homicides and robberies than whites, see BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 65, at 338, drug arrest statistics are driven far more by law en-
forcement practices than actual use or distribution of drugs and, therefore, these statistics do
not accurately measure the rate of "drug crimes." HUMAN RIGHTS WVATCH, PUNISHMENI AND
PREJUDICE: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE WAR ON DRUGS (May, 2000), available at
htt.//vwwv.hrw.org/reports/2000/usa/.
Race is an appropriate factor in stops where the police have been provided with a descrip-
tion of a criminal suspect. In the car stop context, however, descriptions are virtually never at
play since almost all stops are made for alleged traffic violations. "Drug courier" profiles stops
are made when there is no specific criminal information about any particular person. Pedes-
trian stops based on descriptions of alleged perpetrators were fewer than 30% of all stops in the
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the empirical data does not support the notion of a minority-
dominated drug trade. According to national drug abuse studies,
minorities possess and use drugs just slightly more frequently than
whites. 0  Former "Drug Czar" William J. Bennett has stated that
"[t]he typical cocaine user is white, male, a high school graduate em-
ployed full time and living in a small metropolitan -area or suburb." "
Drew S. Days, III, as Solicitor General, defended federal drug charg-
ing patterns, but has stated that "there appears to be a significant dis-
parity" between drug usage by race and arrest rates.! A recent study
found that the rate of drug abuse among adolescents was significantly
higher in rural as opposed to urban areas.r0 Thus, eighth graders in
rural areas, who are far more likely to be white," are 104% more
likely to use amphetamines, 50% more likely to use cocaine, 83%
more likely to use crack cocaine, and 34% more likely to use mari-
juana than their urban counterparts."
In response, law enforcement officials assert that whatever the
rates for use and possession, traffickers and couriers are disproportion-
ately black or Hispanic and, therefore, profiling on the highways is
justified 6 But there is scant data on the racial composition of high-
NewYork Citystudy. REPORT OFATTORNEYGENERALOF NEWYORK, supra note 46. at 122 n.30.
The Federal Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration's 1997 National
Household Survey on Drug Abuse found that the rate of illicit drug use for blacks wais 7.5%. for
whites, 6A%, and for Hispanics, 5.9%. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH .ND HuMN SER'S.. Sttsr.,t%E
ABusE AND MENTAL HEALTH SER\S. ADMIN., NATION.L HOuSEiiOLD SURVE' ON DRL'G ABUSE -
1997 (1997). See also, Sam Vincent Meddis, Is the Dnrg arrRacest? USA TODY.Jul), 23,1993. at
Al (noting that while black and white drug use are nearly the same, the war on drugs his been
fought mainly against blacks). As the Human Rights Watch has reported:
According to the most recent NHSDA [National Household Surxne on Drug Abuse] sur-
vey, in 1998 there were an estimated 9.9 million whites (72 percent of all users) and 2.0
million blacks (15 percent) who were current illicit drug users in 1998. There were al-
most five times as many current white marijuana users as black mad four times as many
white cocaine users. Almost three times as many whites had ever used crack as blacks.
Among those who had used crack at least once in the past year, 462,000 were white and
324,000 were black. Only among current crack users did the number of blacks exceed
the number of whites - and this as a change from previous years in which the number
of current white crack users had exceeded the number of black users. SA.HSA [Sub-
stance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration] also estimated that in 1998
there were 4,934,000 whites who used marijuana on 51 or more days in the past )ear,
compared to 1,102,000 blacks, and 321,000 whites who had used cocaine on 51 or more
days in the past year compared to 171,999 blacks. (citations omitted).
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 78, at 20.
81 Ron Harris, Blacks Feel Brunt of Drug War, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1990, at Al.
82 Drew S. Days III, Race and the Csininal Justice System." A Loak at the Issue of Stkenv. Pracu.
ton, 48 ME. L. REV. 181, 186-87 (1996).
83 Genaro C. Armas, War on Drugs Nczds to Readt Small Towns, Rural Areas, Study Says, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Jan. 27, 2000, at A9 (citing study released by the National Center on Addiction and
Substance Abuse at Columbia University).
84 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population (1990). atad.
able at http://-.%%w,.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/CPI-US.PDF.
Armas, supra note 83 (citing study released by the National Center on Addiction and Sub-
stance Abuse at Columbia University). Among African-Americans. use of drugs has consistenly
run at lower levels than among whites. HUMAN RIGHTS W'ATCH, supra note 78, at 19-20.
s6 E.g., Meddis, supra note 80.
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way drug traffickers or couriers. The former Chief of DEA could not
be any more specific than his assertion that it is "probably safe to say
whites... [constitute] the majority of traffickers."87 Human Rights
Watch has reported:
There are no comparable annual statistics on the estimated number and
race of drug sellers nationwide. Nevertheless, such data as exists indi-
cates whites constitute a far greater share of the drug selling population
than of the population arrested for drug selling. For example, during
the period 1991-1993, SAMHSA included questions about drug selling in
the annual NHSDA surveys. Although the responses are best seen as a
rough approximation of drug selling activity, they are nonetheless highly
suggestive. On average over the three year period, blacks were 16 per-
cent of admitted sellers and whites were 82 percent. According to re-
search on patterns of drug purchase and use in selected major cities,
drug users reported that their main drug sources were sellers of the same
racial or ethnic background as they were. A large study conducted in the
Miami, Florida metropolitan area of 699 cocaine users (power and crack)
revealed that over 96 percent of the users in each ethnic/racial category
were involved in street-level drug dealing, which again would suggest a
racial profile of sellers that is comparable to that of users. General Barry
McCaffrey has stated that drug transactions between youth are generally
intra-racial, that is, youth tend to buy from sellers of the same race.
ONDCP's [Office of National Drug Control Policy] former periodic re-
port on drugs trends, Pulse Check, also indicated a high frequency of intra-
racial drug transactions, that is, that whites tended to buy from white
sellers and minorities from minority sellers.88
Moreover, arrest statistics are notoriously misleading, particularly
where profiling is practiced. The Attorney General of New Jersey di-
rectly addressed the assumption that minorities are disproportion-
ately positioned among couriers, thus justifying highway racial profil-
ing:
The evidence for this conclusion is, in reality, tautological and reflects as
much as anything the initial stereotypes of those who rely upon these sta-
tistics. To a large extent, these statistics have been used to grease the
wheels of a vicious cycle-a self-fulfilling prophecy where law enforce-
ment agencies rely on arrest data that they themselves generated as a re-
sult of the discretionary allocation of resources and targeted drug en-
forcement efforts.
The most obvious problem is relying on arrest statistics, of course, is that
these numbers refer only to persons who were found to be involved in
criminal activity (putting aside for the moment the presumption of inno-
cence). Arrest statistics, by definition, do not show the number of per-
sons who were detained or investigated who, as it turned out, were not
found to be trafficking drugs or carrying weapons. Consistent with our
human nature, we in law enforcement proudly display seized drug ship-
ments or "hits" as a kind of trophy, but pay scant attention to our far
87 1&
88 HuNAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 78, at 20-21.
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more frequent "misses," that is, those instances where stops and searches
failed to discover contraband. (Recall that among the universe of stops,
searches are quite rare, and searches that reveal evidence of crime arc
rarer still.) Logically, of course, one cannot hope to judge the overall ef-
fectiveness of any practice or program by looking solely at its successes,
any more than by looking only at its failures.
Empirical evidence gained from the review of car stops and
searches supports this view. On the NewJersey Turnpike, seizures of
contraband made incident to traffic stops were made at a rate of
10.5% from white drivers and 13.5% from black drivers.0 In Mary-
land, searches on 1-95 resulted in "find rates" that were roughly equal
by race.9' In both states, the large majority of seizures were of rela-
b9 INTERIM REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEJERsEv, supra note 32, at 67-68. See aso,
Developments in the Law - Race and the Criminal Prot&s 101 WR. L RE . 1473. 1508 (1988) (as-
serting that use of arrest statistics tojustify use of race creates self-fulfilling prophecy because it
encourages the police to arrest minorities more frequently).
Empirical data regarding use of drug courier profiles at airports and other transportation
hubs similarly expose the flaws in rel)ing on factors unrelated to criminal conduct. See, eg.,
United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 500 (2d Cir. 1991) (Prat,J., dissenting) (noting that in
an operation at the Buffalo Airport, police were "correct" in their stops in fewer titan two per-
cent of their profile encounters). Similar results mark other profile based investigations.
United States v. Montoya de Herandez, 473 U.S. 531, 557 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[T]he available evidence suggests that the number of highly intrusihe border searches of sus-
picious-looking but ultimately innocent travelers may be very high."): United States v. Montilla.
733 F. Supp 579,580 (WD.N.Y. 1990) (agents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency observing
bus passengers in New York made eighty stops per month, which resulted in only three to four
arrests). See also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 441-42 (1991) (Marshallj.. dissenting) (not-
ing that only a small number of the numerous police sweeps for drugs actually result in a suc-
cessful interdiction of drugs); Morgan Cloud, Search and Seiure by the Numbre: The Drug CGwrztr
Profile andJudicial Review ofInvestigathe Formulas, 65 B.U. L REV. 843, 873-77 (1985) (noting the
flaws in the drug courier profile when compared to the aircraft hijacker profile).
Professor David Cole has demonstrated how the drug courier profile can be manipulated
to fit virtually any form of innocent activity of a person at an airport, including whether one is
the first or the last to leave the plane, whether one appears nervous or calm, and whether one is
dressed expensively or modestly. COLE., supra note 25, at 47-51. Further, his computer search
of all federal cases involving drug courier profile stops over a four-year period showed that 80%
of those stopped were minorities, Id. at 40.
In part, the approval of profile stops is a predictable consequence of the types of cases that
actually reach the courts. For the most part, judges see only those cases in which drugs or other
contraband are seized. In such cases, enormous pressure exists to ignore constitutional viola-
tions so as to avoid suppression of the evidence. In the thousands of cases where the individual
stopped is innocent, even if that person was detained and searched illegally, it is unlikely that
she will pursue legal remedies. See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Armndirent,
35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197, 244-45 (1993) (noting that individuals who have been searched
illegally are unlikely to complain). Thus, the case law develops on a highly skcwed notion of
reality, subject to the distorting effect of discovery of contraband in the specific case. See, Flor-
ida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 463 (1989) (BrennanJ., dissenting) ('It is difficult to avoid the con-
clusion that the plurality has allowed its analysis... to be colored by its distaste for the activity
in which [the defendant was involved].").
90 INTERM REPORT OFATrORNEY GENERAL OF NEJERSE:V; supra note 32, at 26-28.
91 Expert Reports of John Lamberth, Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches v.
Maryland Department of State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d 560 (D. Md. 1999) (Civ. No. CCB-98-
1098), available at http://-w.adu.org/court/lamberti.lhtnil (on file with author). See aLso
Maclin, Race, supra, note 25, at 349-51 (1998) (noting that the percentage of traffic stops that
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tively small amounts of drugs, indicating possession for personal use.9 '
In Illinois, searches of Hispanics yielded a lower percentage of nar-
cotics than of whites.93
Defenders of these practices have argued that the data does not
disprove the assertion that the police are engaged in rational dis-
crimination and efficient law enforcement practices in focusing on
minority motorists. For example, a study of the Maryland 1-95
searches concluded that the equal rates in the seizure of drug con-
traband from all African-American and white motorists who had been
stopped and subjected to a search demonstrated that the "equilib-
rium" between these races was the product of police targeting of mi-
nority motorists who previously were transporting drugs at a signifi-
cantly higher rate than whites. The study is questionable on both
methodological and legal grounds. First, as a statistical matter, the
study assumes that the extremely small number of searches (com-
pared to the motoring population and to the number of motorists ac-
tually stopped) was sufficient to deter African-American drivers from
transporting drugs (there are no data to show the rate of transporta-
tion pre-racial profiling).95 The study also assumes that the police are
accurately reporting searches where nothing is recovered even
though there is evidence to suggest the contrary."
Second, as a matter of constitutional law, the study proceeds on
the theory that the police intentionally targeted African-American
drivers for disproportionate stops and searches" (an assumption con-
tradicted by the state police who have maintained that African-
Americans have not been targeted). But even if there was solid evi-
dence that African-Americans violated the drug laws on 1-95 more of-
ten than whites, the state is prohibited from implementing formal
sanctions that differentiate between the races. Thus, it would be un-
constitutional for the state to enact criminal laws that provide for
harsher prison terms for African-Americans convicted of the same
drug offenses as whites, even in the face of an econometric model
resulted in the discovery of contraband was the same for black and white motorists).
See supra note 91; INTERIM REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 32, at
36-37 (noting that "major" drug seizures on the NewJersey Turnpike were rare).
93 See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
94 John Knowles, et al., Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence 27
(Feb., 2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). The disparities in searches was pro-
found: on a highway on which African-Americans constituted less than 20% of all drivers, of
1,590 searches, 1,007 African Americans were searched (63.4%) and 466 whites were searched
(29.3%). Id. at 16. The remaining searches were of Hispanics (97 searches or 6.1% of all
searches). Id.
95 Id. at 1-3.
96 Id. In NewJersey, two troopers have been indicted for deliberately falsifying records con-
cerning the race of the drivers who were stopped and searched. They are alleged to have re-
corded "white" on the form where the driver was black. E.g., Mark Hosenball, "It is Not the Act of
a Few Bad Apples, "NEWSWEEK, May 17, 1999, at 34.
97 John Knowles, et al., supra note 94, at 1-3.
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that would suggest that this differentiation would ultimately reduce
the disproportionate drug violations by African-Americans as a class.'
The same must be true for an official policy that targets African-
Americans for a highly disproportionate rate of stops and searches
based solely on their race and the alleged criminal propensities of
very small numbers of African-Americans.
Moreover, given the fact that, on a relative scale, so few persons
among the millions of drivers who use these transportation facilities
each day are engaged in illegal drug activity-black or white-and so
few stops or searches result in seizures of contraband, it is hard to jus-
tify the stops of large numbers of innocent blacks to enable the police
to make the occasional seizure.
As Ira Glasser has stated:
Even if most of the drug dealers in the Northeast corridor or in any par-
ticular neighborhood or city are black or Latino, it does not follow that
most blacks and Latinos are drug dealers .... Think about it for a min-
ute. Most players in the NBA are black. But if you were trying to get a
team together, you wouldn't go out in the street and round up random
African Americans.
It's a very simple, logical fallacy. The fact that most drug dealers are X
does not mean that most X are drug dealers. '
98 See infra text accompanying notes 147-149.
See infra text accompanying note 150. It is noteworthy that the Racial Bias study con-
firmed that similar results could be achieved ithout the kind of racial profiling that was prac-
ticed in Maryland.John Knowles, et aL., supra note 94, at 23-26.
a0 Ira Glasser, ACLU Biennial Speech Uune, 1999), avadable at htp://%%wi%,..aclu.org/
issues/racial/bispeech99.hul (on file with author). In Craigx. Borne. 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the
Court found unconstitutional, under intermediate equal protection resiew. a gender classifica-
tion that prohibited sale of 3.2% alcohol to men under 21 and to women under 18. The state
attempted tojustify the discrimination by studies that showed that of 18-20 icar olds who wcre
arrested for drunk driving, .18% of females and 2% of males in that age group had been ar-
rested. Id. at 201. The Court did not deny the disparity in the statistics, but found that. "if
maleness is to serve as a proxy for drinking and driving, a correlation of 2% must be considered
an unduly tenuous 'fi' Id. at 201-02. Sce also, id. at 213-14 (Stteens.J., concurring) ('[lit does
not seem to me that an insult to all of the young men of the state can be justified by visiting the
sins of the 2% on the 98%.').
For an incisive discussion of police stereotyping. police discretion, and order maintenance,
see M. GoTEREDSON & D. GoTTFR.EDSON, DECISION ,LUU.NG IN CRIMINkLJUStcICE: TOWARD THE
RATIONAL EXERcISE OF DISCRETON (2d ed. 1988); JEROME H. SKOL=ICE JUSTICE WmioLT
TRLAL: LAW ENFORCE.MiENT IN DEMocRATc SociEly 80-81 (MacMillan 3d ed. 1994) (1966);
SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYStEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMNAL Ji C.,
1950-1990 (1993); Roberts, supra note 64, at 811 (discussing the potential for reinforcing racist
norms in order-maintenance policing); Thompson, supra note 25. at 986-87 (discussing the role
of stereotyping in police investigations); Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Duerrtwn 17 Adunstratu'e
Regulations: The Use Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Polirs in Fourth Awldlrnzt Adjudica-
tion, 89 MICH. L REv. 442 (1990) (discussing police rulemaking and judicial interpretations of
police discretion). The role of subconscious racism has also been explored. See, e.g., Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Proteion: Redorang eith L'nronscous Razsvz, 39 STXN. L
REv. 317 (1987) (discussing unconscious racism and a new test for establishing race-based be-
havior); Sheri LynnJohnson, Comment, Unconscious Rasrmn and the Cnunal Lau 73 CORNELL L
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Of course, while playing the numbers may be good strategy at the
card tables at Atlantic City, several miles away on the New Jersey
Turnpike the consequences of such a numbers game can be corrosive
of legal and moral norms. As David A. Harris has stated:
Behind the race-neutral reasons police give lies a stark truth. When offi-
cers stop disproportionate members of African-Americans because this is
"just good police work," they are using race as a proxy for the criminality
or "general criminal propensity" of an entire racial group. Simply put,
police are targeting all African-Americans because some are criminals. In
essence, this thinking predicts that all blacks, as a group, share a general
propensity to commit crimes. Therefore, having black skin becomes
enough-perhaps along with a minimal number of other factors, per-
haps alone-for law enforcement to stop and detain someone.'
No one denies that the crime rates of young urban minorities are
higher than those of elderly whites. But to jump from this obvious
fact, to the use of race as a general proxy for crime, ignores the
equally significant fact that very few minorities commit crimes (and
thus an entire class is stigmatized and subjected to harsher treatment
for the acts of a few). Further, such a racial proxy fails to consider
the enormous damage (even to law enforcement interests) that is
done by the resentment and anger that is stirred by this type of polic-
ing. Quality of life policing carries with it the strong potential for
undermining the legitimacy of police operations, and when race be-
comes a factor in the exercise of police discretion, the potential is
very likely to become manifest.
Finally, racial profiling must be considered in the context of this
country's escalating incarceration rates. The statistics regarding race
and incarceration rates are stark and deeply troubling. African-
American men constitute approximately 7% of the population.'02 In
1930, they constituted 22% of all prison admissions; today they com-
prise 51% of admissions, a rate six times that of white men.03 Nearly
one in three black males aged 20-29 is under some form of criminal
justice supervision on any given day.' ° A black male born in 1991 has
a 29% chance of spending some time in prison during his lifetime.""
REV. 1016 (1988) (discussing how the Supreme Court has ignored unconscious racism in its
decisions).
101 Harris, Driving While Black supra note 25, at 572. For discussion of the legality of these
practices, see discussion infra Part III. Randall Kennedy has likened racial profiling to "a type of
racial tax for the war against drugs that whites and other groups escape." KENNEDY, supra note
76, at 159. During the Jim Crow era, courts expressly permitted juries to consider race as evi-
dence of criminal intent. Id. at 89-90; see McQuirter v. State, 63 So. 2d 388, 390 (Ala. Ct. App.
1953) (stating that ajury in determining whether black man intended to rape a white woman,
"may consider social conditions and customs founded upon racial differences, such as that the
prosecutrix was a white woman and defendant was a Negro man").
102 NATIONAL CRIM.JUST. COMM'N, THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, 102 (Steven R. Donzinger ed.,
1996).
103 Id at 102-03.
104 MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE, 124-25 (1999).
105 Id. at 125.
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The figure for whites is 4% and for Hispanics, 16%."'
A major contributing factor in the escalating disparities in impris-
onment is the War on Drugs.0 ' Although African-Americans use and
possess drugs in close approximation to their numbers in the overall
population, they account for 37% of those arrested, 55% of those
convicted and 74% of those incarcerated for drug offenses."S From
1985 to 1995, there was over a 100% increase in the number of drug
offenders in state prison (38,900 to 224,900).' ° One in four inmates,
as opposed to the 1980 rate of one in sixteen is a drug offender."' In
the federal system, 59% of inmates are incarcerated on drug
charges."' Overall, in 1995, of 1,700,000 inmates in state and federal
prisons, 400,000 were held on drug charges.'
2
Differentials in sentencing schemes and police practices contrib-
ute to the racial disparities. Mandatory federal sentencing statutes
punish crack cocaine offense much more harshly than powder co-
caine: 500 grams of powder cocaine will result in a five year manda-
tory sentence while only 5 grams of crack cocaine will trigger the
same sentence."3  Between 1989 to 1990, close to 90% of persons
charged with crack cocaine offenses were African-American, but
fewer than 35% of those was charged with federal powder cocaine of-
fenses were Af ican-Americans.
106 Id. While there is a disproportionate number of African-Americans in jail, much of this
disproportionality can be explained by racial differences at arrest. Alfred Blunistein. Racial Du-
proportionality of U.S. Prison Populations ReisitA', 64 U. COLO. L REv. 743, 750-54 (1993) (noting
at 76% of the disproportionality can be explained by racial differences at arrest).
107 E.g., HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 78, at 13; Blumstein, supra note 106. at 756-59
(discussing the racial implications of the war on drugs).
109 ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 11.
109 MAUER, supra note 104, at 35.
11 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 78, at 13-16.
' Id at 14.
112 ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 10. In 1996. of all admissions to state prisons for drug of-
fenses, blacks constituted 62.6%, while whites constituted 36.7%. HU. L'%. RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 78, at 17.
118 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994).
114 NATIONAL CRIM.JUST. CoMM'N, supra note 102, at 118-119. The argument that these sta-
tistics simply reflect prosecutions of high level crack dealers runs counter to data from the
United States Sentencing Commission. In 1992, of all crack offenders, only 5.5c wlere classified
as high level dealers. 63.7% were listed as street-level dealers or couriers and 30.8' as mid-level
dealers. MARC MAUER, supra note 104, at 156. For commentary on the crack/powder cocaine
dispute, see COLE, supra note 25, at 8, 141-44 (discussing the racially disparate effects of federal
sentencing for crack cocaine); Days III, supra note 82, at 189-93 (discussing the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines for cocaine and crack); David A. Sklansky. Cocaine, Ram and Equal Pr'etzon,
47 STAN. L REV. 1283 (1995) (discussing the mandatory federal sentences for trafficking crack
cocaine and arguing that such sentences violate the Equal Protection Clause because tie brunt
of the sentences fall on African-Americans). To date, even court of appeals to consider the
issue has determined that there is no equal protection violation presented by the application of
these statutes. See eg., United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that the
Second Circuit had joined six other circuits in holding that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines*
100 to 1 ratio of powder cocaine to crack cocaine in detennining jail time has a rational basis
and does not violate equal protection principles); United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500,
1530 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting claim that the section of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
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Race discrimination has also been documented in the critical de-
cisions made by prosecutors and courts to transfer accused offenders
from juvenile to adult court for trial. In a recent study in California,
it was determined that minority juveniles were more than twice as
likely to be transferred to adult court for case disposition than their
white counterparts."" In Los Angeles, in 1996, of the 561 juvenile
felony cases transferred to adult court, 5% were white, 6% were
Asian, 30% were black and 59% were Hispanic. ' 6 The seriousness of
the charges and criminal histories did not explain these disparities."
7
Further, once they entered the adult system, young African-
Americans were 18.4, and Hispanics were 7.3 times more likely to be
incarcerated than white offenders."8  Finally, there is growing evi-
dence of racially disproportionate disenfranchisement of African-
Americans under state laws that suspend or forfeit the right to vote
for persons convicted of crime. ,'9
There can be no doubting the fact that in policing-as in many
areas of contemporary American life-race matters, and matters a
that deal with powder cocaine and crack cocaine violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection, noting that a disparate racial impact does not necessarily imply intentional dis-
crimination); United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 741 (lst Cir. 1994) (holding that there is
insufficient evidence to find that the sections of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that deal
with powder and crack cocaine violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Days III, supra note 82, at 189 (noting that each of the twelve circuit courts to examine
the issue found that the Sentencing Guidelines that deal with crack cocaine and powder co-
caine do not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
"1 Tamar Lewin, Discrepancy By Race Found In the Trying Of Youths, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2000, at
A21 [hereinafter Lewin, Discrepancy]. See also George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities
in Official Assessments ofJuvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereot)pes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM.
Soc. REV. 554 (1998) (noting the "pronounced differences in [police] officers' attributions
about the causes of crime by white versus black youths"); Tamar Lewin, Study inds Racial Bias in
Public Schools, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 1, 2000, at A14 (discussing report of Applied Research Center of
Oakland which found that blacks are 3-5 times more likely to be expelled from high school than
whites for similar offenses).
116 Lewin, Discrepancy, supra note 115, at A21.
117 Id
118 Id. This is not to suggest that the mere disparity in numbers is conclusive on the question
of racial bias. For example, differential enforcement patterns can contribute to the disparities.
Inner city drug dealing is more likely to occur on the street with the attendant hazards and
crime associated with open market drug dealing, while drugs in the suburbs tend to be distrib-
uted and used behind closed doors. The inner city drug operations tend to be minority-run;
suburban to be white. It is far easier to police the street markets and, because of the secondary
criminal and quality of life impact street sales create, there is more demand for police interven-
tion in these areas. William J. Stuntz, Race, Class and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795 (1998);
KENNEDY, supra note 75, at 378n.*. Further, it has been argued that differences in usage and
trafficking patterns explain the disparate racial arrest statistics. Days III, supra note 82, at 187-
88.
Policing policies in minority communities have generated sharp disagreements. Compare
KENNEDY, supra note 76, at 138-63 (discussing policing policies in minority neighborhoods),
with Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and the Law,111 IHARV. L. REV.
1270 (1998) (critically reviewing RANDALLKENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1998)).
119 George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of In-
famia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895 (1999).
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lot.L12 The substantial racial disparities that have been documented in
stop, frisk, and search practices cannot be full) explained or rational-
ized by crime patterns, police deployment, or policing tactics. Fur-
ther, arguments of efficiency and rational discrimination flounder on
empirical, constitutional, and moral principles. Yet, in the face of the
growing evidence of arbitrary stops, frisks and searches, the courts
have in many instances failed to order relief that is commensurate
with the extraordinary deviation from legal norms. To understand
this state of affairs, I turn to an examination of the legal standards
that govern these police practices.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK: RACLAL PROFILING AND
STOPS AND SEARCHES WITHOUT CAUSE
Law enforcement's interest in maximizing the number of con-
tacts, stops and searches of cars and pedestrians has prevailed over
constitutionally-based claims of racial equality, privacy, and individual
integrity. The Supreme Court has been highly deferential to order-
maintenance policing and has imposed substantial limitations on the
federal court's powers to remedy constitutional violations. In this
Part, I discuss the governing federal substantive standards for car and
pedestrian stops and the application of this doctrine to racial profil-
ing and random stop practices. In the next part, I address the reme-
dial issues. '
2
A. Automobile Stops
The constitutional story with respect to Fourth Amendment prin-
ciples has been told-and told well-by others,'; so I will trace only
the most significant legal developments as they relate to traffic stops
and racial profiling. The Supreme Court has permitted stops of cars
based on cause to believe that a crime has been committed, including
any traffic violation.2' Further, once a car has been permissibly
stopped, the driver and passengers can be ordered to stand outside of
the vehicle (for the officer's protection), without any objective show-
ing of harm or danger.2 4 At any time during the encounter, and even
U0 See CoRNTL NEsT, RAcE MATERs (1993) (discussing ie continuing issues of race and
racism in the United States).
121 State law may provide broader remedies than those aailable under federal law. David A.
Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States: A Case Study of the 'Ne' Fdealm 'in Castautional
0iminalProcedure, 3 U. PA.J. CONsT. L 368 (2001).
1 E.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE: A TRE.TISE ON lHE FOL 4RTH \MENDMENT
(3d ed. 1996); Maclin, Race, supra note 25 (discussing the competing concernts imvoled in
Fourth Amendment analysis and application); SIdansky, supra note 25. For a recent compre-
hensive historical analysis of the Fourth Amendment, see Thomas Y. Davies. Rewtmnug the Ong-
nalFourth Amendmen, 98 MICH L. REV. 547 (1999).
12 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816-19 (1996).
124 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997); Pennsikunia v. Minims, 434 U.S. W16. I I l
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after a ticket or warning may have been issued, the police can secure
consent to search the persons or the car without any statement that
no consent need be given, or that they are free to leave.' Any con-
traband that is observed in "plain view," including detection by use of
a flashlight, can be immediately seized and used as probable cause to
arrest. Dunng the stop, any person who appears to present a dan-
ger to the officer (and the car itself), may be frisked for the officer's
protection. 712  If cause is established to arrest any of the occupants, a
full-scale search of the car including suitcases and other private con-
tainers, and of all other passengers is permissible.'8
The police may question the driver or occupants of the car with-
out providing Miranda warnings,1 29 even if they are seeking informa-
tion about drugs.Y Of course, this questioning is often a prelude to a
request to search ("I understand that you say you do not have drugs;
do you mind if we search?"), without any warning to the driver of his
right to refuse consent. Further the police may use a trained dog to
detect narcotics without any suspicion, cause, or consent. 13
Since virtually every driver commits violations of the traffic laws on
a regular basis,'32 the police have enormous discretion to effectuate
stops of a very high number of cars, thus presenting the critical issue
of pretextual stops and searches. For some time the lower federal
courts divided on this Fourth Amendment question: in circum-
stances where a traffic violation has occurred, thereby creating prob-
able cause for a stop, should a court consider the officer's subjective
intentions or motivations in effectuating the stop, including possible
(1977)
M Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (holding that a lawfully seized defendant need not
be advised that he is "free to go" before his consent to search will be recognized as voluntary).
126 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133-37 (1990) (reviewing the "plain view" doctrine);
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (asserting that use of a searchlight to discover
contraband does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
17 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1035 (1983) (holding that a protective search of the
passenger compartment of a motor vehicle during lawful investigatory stop of an occupant of
the vehicle was reasonable).
1 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302-07 (1999) (holding that police officers with
probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers' belongings found in the car that are ca-
pable of concealing the object of the search); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574 (1991)
(holding that police may search container located within automobile withott a search warrant);
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (upholding the search of the passenger compart-
ment of a vehicle and examination of the contents of any container found within the passenger
com2partment when the search is contemporaneous to a lawful arrest of an occupant).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440-41 (1984) (holding that roadside questioning is
not custodial and therefore Miranda warnings are not required).121
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983) (holding that a dog sniff of luggage lo-
cated in a public place is not a search under the Fourth Amendment). In City of Independence v.
Edmond, 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000), the Supreme Court found unconstitutional the practice of using
roadblocks to stop cars to allow for dog drug sniffs of the car.
Harris, Drizing While Black supra note 25 at 545.
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racial profiling of the driver?' s
The Supreme Court decided this issue in WHqren v. United States.""
There, Washington, D.C. police officers had made a traffic stop and
observed two bags of crack cocaine in the hands of a front-seat pas-
senger.Is ' The police testified that the stop was made because the
driver had violated several traffic laws, including pausing at a stop
sign for an "unusually long time," turning without signaling, and then
proceeding at an "unreasonable speed."- " The defendants claimed
that the stop was pretextual: that the police were suspicious because
they observed two black men in a Nissan Pathfinder in Southeast
Washington and, lacking any cause for a stop to investigate drugs, de-
cided to stop on the basis of alleged traffic violations to place them in
the position where they could conduct a drug investigation. ' In fact,
the officers involved, on a vice-detail, were prohibited by departmen-
tal regulation from making routine traffic stops."
The Supreme Court ruled that from a Fourth Amendment per-
spective the "constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops" does not
depend "on the actual motivations of the individual officers.""' Ac-
cording to the Court, the only relevant question was whether, looking
at the circumstances from an objective viewpoint, the officer had le-
gal cause for the stop.' ° The Court rejected the claim that the Fourth
Amendment requires consideration of whether "the officer's conduct
deviated materially from usual police practices, so that a reasonable
officer in the same circumstances would not have made the stop for
the reasons given.
"
1
1 See Sklansky, supra note 25, at 285-91 (discussingJustice Scalia's opinion in IItren and not-
ing the split decisions in the lower and state courts regarding the subjective intent of ie officer
making the stop). Specifically, the lower courts had divided over whether a stop was justified
where an officer could have made a proper traffic stop, see for example, Umted Stat t Btaeo-
Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 786-88 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the " would have" standard), or only
where a reasonable officer would have done so, see for example, Unted States v. Cannon. 29 F.3d
472,474-76 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (accepting the "would have" standard after discussing the
circuit split).
13 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
i d. at 808-09.
"' Id. at808.
13 Id. at 808-09.
138 Id. at 815.
'S9 Id. at 813.
140 Id. at 813-14.
14Id. at 814. Justice Kennedy dissented from the Court's later decision in Manland t, IlSlLn
to permit police to order all occupants out of a stopped car, uithout suspicion:
The practical effect of our holding in lMiren, of course, is to allow the police to stop vehi-
cles in almost countless circumstances. When lirn is coupled with today's holding, the
Court puts tens of millions of passengers at risk of arbitrary control by tie police. If the
command to exit were to become commonplace, the Constitution would be diminished
in a most public way. As the standards suggested in dissent are adequate to protect tie
safety of the police, we ought not to suffer so great a loss.
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,423 (1997) (Kennedy.j., dissenting).
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In response to the claim that pretextual stops could be racially
motivated, the Court stated that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment would prohibit any intentional race dis-
crimination in a car stop.4 2 However, this perfunctory statement did
not address the means by which an intentional race discrimination
claim could be proven or what remedies might be available to either
a criminal defendant or civil litigant.
43
Courts and commentators have correctly made the point that pre-
textual stops, and particularly those based on racial considerations,
are inconsistent with the "reasonableness" requirements of the
Fourth Amendment.' Assuming, however, that the Supreme Court
continues to insist that subjective motivations, including racially mo-
tivated conduct, are not pertinent to the Fourth Amendment in-
142 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
143 As Professor Paul Butler has noted,Justice Scalia authored both Whren and the dissent in
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 728 (1988), in which Justice Scalia quoted Justice Robert Jack-
son on the dangers of selective prosecution:
If the prosecutor is obligated to choose his case, it follows that he can choose his defen-
dants. Therein is the most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that he will pick people
that he thinks he should get, rather than cases that need to be prosecuted. With die law
books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of find-
ing at least a technical violation of some act on the part of almost anyone .... It is in this
realm-in which the prosecutor picks some person whom he dislikes or desires to em-
barrass, or selects some group of unpopular persons and then looks for an offense, that
the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies. It is here that law enforcement
becomes personal, and the real crime becomes that of being unpopular with the pre-
dominant or governing group.
Paul Butler, Starr is to Clinton as Regular Prosecutors Are to Blacks, 40 B.C. L. REV. 705, 709-10
(1999) (citing Olson, 487 U.S. at 728).
144 See, e.g., State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1999) (rejecting the use of pretextual traflic
stops, holding that the provision of the state constitution prohibiting the invasion of private
affairs or the home without authority of law forbids use of pretext as a justification for a war-
rantless search); Thompson, supra note 25, at 983-999 (pointing to the history behind the
Fourth Amendment and social scientific research regarding racial stereotyping to show the con-
flict between racial profiling and the reasonableness standard of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion,
72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1271, 1285-86 (1998) [hereinafter Maclin, Terry v. Ohio] (arguing that
the Terry decision was flawed because it opened the door for the consideration of race as an
element in the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment); Maclin, Race, supra
note 25, at 362 (suggesting that pretextual traffic stops based on race don't meet the Fourth
Amendment "reasonableness" standard); Harris, Driving While Black, supra note 25 at 549-550
(chastising the Whren Court for ignoring the fact that racially motivated pretexutal stops could
be unreasonable); Sklansky, supra note 25, at 327 (stating that "there is nothing new in the sug-
gestion that equality is the proper concern of more than one provision of the Constitution").
See also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 808 (1994)
("[I]n a variety of search and seizure contexts, we must honestly address racially imbalanced
effects and ask ourselves whether they are truly reasonable."); Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative
Dimension of Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness," 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642 (1998) (arguing that
the qualitative basis for establishing probable cause is incomplete and requires both procedural
and substantive safeguards); Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication,
96 MICH. L. REv. 2001 (1998) (discussing the problems of shifting racial profiling analysis from
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to jurisprudence based on the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
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quiry,5 federal challenges to racial profiling must be mounted on
grounds of racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment
or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Challenges could also be
made under state law in jurisdictions that do not follow 11%ren or that
provide an exclusionary remedy in criminal prosecutions for racially
discriminatory stops or searches.
6
1 There are decided similarities between profile stops and ie notorious 'rits of assis-
tance," the general -%wrrants employed by British soldiers to enter colonial residences to search
for violations of customs and duties provisions. NELSON B. L ssON. Tile HtsTOm" ANDi
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDIMENTl
" 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTIT'TION (1937);
Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History. Searching for Histon, 63 U. CHI. L REV. 1707, 1737-39
(1996) (reviewing William John Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original
Meaning (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation available from UMI Dissertation Services. 300
N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106)); sce also David Rudovsky. Th hi.paa of the War on
Drugs on Procedural Faimess and Radal Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEC,,%L F. 237, 242-45 (1994) (com-
paring the use of the writs of assistance by the British during the colonial period to the present
methods used in fighting the War on Drugs); Sklansky. supm note 25, at 286 (discussing the
writs of assistance and comparing them to pretextual traffic stops). These writs were issued by
the Crown without a showing of cause and the colonial reaction to the practice of searches
withoutjudicial authorization is widely regarded as a highly significant factor in the adoption of
the Fourth Amendment. See, eg., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476. 481-88 (1965) (discussing the
origins of the Fourth Amendment); see also M.H. SMITH. THE WRITS OF ASSSr ANE CASE 5-6,
493-97 (1978). While the writs of assistance marked an invasive and harassing program against
the colonists, they were not without a "profile"justification: there %as a large conspiracy among
the colonists to thwart the collection of duties and evidence of this conduct was regularli found
in the searches conducted by British agents. I. at 1-7.
In many respects, racial profiling and random stops are the contemporary equivalents of
the writs of assistance. They are based on the same assumptions and proceed on the notion
that even without specific reason to believe that any particular person is engaged in illegal activ-
ity, the "profile" limits the universe of suspects and will in some cases lead to evidence of crimi-
nal conduct. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 722 N.E.2d 429, 435 (Mass. 2000) (stating that
roadblocks used to search for evidence of drug trafficking was comparable to writs of assis-
tance); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 636 A.2d 619, 625 (Pa. 1994) (-The facile reliance on drug
courier profiles is reminiscent of... the general warrants of the British.'). Ser alsoThompson,
supra note 25, at 992-98 (discussing relationship of the writs of assistance during the colonial
period, the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and race discrimination); Maclin. Race. supra
note 25, at 334-36 (noting the broad search authority of'slave patrols during die colonial period
and comparing mild colonial reaction to these patrols with fierce resistance to tie writs of assis-
tance).
9 An argument could be made that a shoing of intentional race discrimination under tie
Fourteenth Amendment should result in the exclusion of evidence derived from that miscon-
duct. Eg., United States v.Jennings, No. 91-5942, 1993 WL 5927, at *4 (6th Cir.Jan. 13, 1993)
(affirming conviction based on consent search but suggesting that racial bias in stop is grounds
for exclusion ofevidence). Surely, this type of violation is at least as serious as the violation of
Fourth Amendment rights and the need for deterrence would appear to be as strong. Karlan,
supra note 144, at 2009-11 (arguing that suppression of evidence is one of the only remedies to
deter police misconduct); seeAndrew D. Leipold, Obcciht TestsAndSubtCim.Bias" SorPtne&rNsM
ofDiscriminatoyy Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L RE%. 559, 571 (1998) (noting die dif-
ficulty that a defendant faces in tr)ing to exclude evidence obtained based on a racially moti-
vated stop).
State courts have suppressed evidence as a result of findings of racial profiling. Eg., Com-
monwealth v. Gonsalves, 711 N.E.2d 108, 115-16 (Mass. 1999) (Ireland, J., concurring) (sup-
porting the suppression of evidence gathered as a result of racial profiling by police): State v.
Donahue, 742 A.2d 775,782 (Conn. 1999) (suppressing evidence gathered during investigatory
stop, noting that the case raises the "insidious specter of "profiling'"): State v. Soto, 734 k2d
350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
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1. Intentional Race Discrimination Under the Fourteenth Amendment
A claim of impermissible racial discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment involves two broad
areas of inquiry: whether the practice or policy expressly or inten-
tionally classifies persons on the basis of race and, if so, whether the
race based classification withstands strict judicial scrutiny."' A prac-
tice or policy based on an explicit racial classification is "immediately
suspect," triggering detailed examination and may be upheld only
when shown to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling govern-
ment interest.'
48
Intentional race discrimination may be shown by a law that "ex-
pressly classifies persons on the basis of race,"' 41 or by a practice or
policy that treats one differently from members of other racial groups
to whom he is similarly situated, if applied in an intentionally dis-
criminatory manner.'0 Thus, in the racial profiling context, estab-
lished policies or practices authorizing stops based on racial charac-
teristics will enable a plaintiff to proceed under the first theory.''
But, as is usually the case, where there is no direct proof of such a
policy or practice, statistical evidence will be necessary to show that
the police acted with the intent to discriminate. Disparate impact
alone is not sufficient, as the "invidious quality of a law claimed to be
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially dis-
criminatory purpose.',
5 2
147 SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that racial clas-
sifications in affirmative action program must be analyzed under strict scrutiny).
148 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642-43 (1993) (finding that North Carolina's redistricting
legislation was so irregular that it could only be rationally viewed as an attempt to segregate
races for voting purposes).
149 Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at
227-29). See also Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000) (striking down a provision of Hawaii
Constitution limiting by ancestry the right to vote for trustees of agency that administers pro-
grams for descendants of Polynesians who occupied island before 1778, finding that the provi-
sion violated the Fifteenth Amendment).
150 E.g.,Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
151 Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that when criminal per-
petrator is described as African American, no Fourteenth Amendment violation results from
the stopping of all blacks in community because the expressed policy for the stops was racially
neutral); United States v. Avery, 128 F.3d 974, 985 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause results if law enforcement personnel "adopt[] a policy, employs a
practice, or in a given situation takes steps to initiate an investigation ... based solely upon that
citizen's race"); Alexis v. McDonald's Restaurants, 67 F.3d 341, 353-54 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding
that use of excessive force to effect a forcible removal from the restaurant was motivated by a
discriminatory animus).
152 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). See also, Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977) (holding that discriminatory intent
can be shown by a combination of factors, including impact, historical context, substantive de-
partures from norms, and administrative practices; plaintiff must show race was "a motivating
factor," not the "sole" or "primary" reason). Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (noting
that legislative motivation is a central question in determining claims of racial gerrymandering;
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Use of statistical evidence to establish intentional race discrimina-
tion in criminal trial settings has met with mixed results. The Su-
preme Court has sustained attacks on racially discriminator), jury se-
lection procedures and racially-based peremptory challenges upon
statistical evidence that demonstrated that race played an impermis-
sible role in these proceedings."' In these cases the Court established
a base line for establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination
that could be satisfied by statistical evidence concerning the chal-
lenged practices. 54
In Hunter v. Underwood,"' the Court sustained an equal protection
claim by African-Americans who claimed that the), were disenfran-
chised for convictions under an Alabama law that w-as adopted with
the intent to discriminate on the basis of race, and which in fact had
a racially discriminatory impact on African-Americans.' " As proof of
the impact, the Court noted that blacks were disenfranchised under
this law at a rate 1.7 times more often than whites in certain counties,
and up to 10 times more often in other areas of the state."" The
Court did not require proof of the identity of white persons who were
not disenfranchised because their convictions were for crimes not
circumstantial and statistical evidence may be used to prove racial motivation). The Supreme
Court has also permitted a finding of discriminatory intent where the law or policy promotes
racial stereotypes. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469. 493 (1989): Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104 (1986) (Marshall,J., concurring) (stating that 'the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits a State from taking any action based on crude, inaccurate racial stereotypes');
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630-31 (1991) (cautioning against 'auto-
matic invocation of race stereotypes" in determining that peremptory challenges excluding ju-
rors based on race in private civil cases was unconstitutional). In Rite u. Carydano 120 S. CL
1044 (2000), the Court found that ancestral voting restrictions were based on a "demeaning
premise that citizens of a particular race are somehow more qualified to vote on certain mat-
ters," id. at 1060, and were "corruptive of the ... legal order," id. at 1046.
13 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94-98 (1986). Sre aLso Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400
(1991) (holding that criminal defendant may object to race-based exclusion of jurors effected
through peremptory challenges whether or not defendant and excluded jurors share same
race); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (holding that a showing that the population of
the county was 79.1% Mexican-American. but that over an I 1-year period only 39% of the per-
sons summoned for grand jury service were Mexican-American, established a prima facie case of
discrimination against Mexican-Americans in grandjury selection); Alexander v. Louisiana. 405
U.S. 625 (1972) (holding that statistics may establish a prima facie case of invidious racial dis-
crimination in the selection of the grandjury).
1 As an example of how a plaintiff may prove an inference of discrimination, the Batson
Court noted that a "pattern" of strikes against black jurors included in the particular ienire
might give rise to an inference of discrimination, and further stated:
In cases involving the venire, this Court has found a prima fatie case on proof that
members of the defendant's race were substantially underrepresented on the venire
from which his jury was drawn, and that the venire was selected under a practice provid-
ing "the opportunity for discrimination." This combination of factors raises the neces-
sary inference of purposeful discrimination because the Court has declined to attribute
to chance the absence of black citizens on a particular jury array %%here the selection
mechanism is subject to abuse.
476 U.S. at95 (citations omitted).
1 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
'33 Id
157 Id. at 227.
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deemed to involve moral turpitude (the disenfranchising trigger). 8
However, in McCleskey v. Kemp,' 9 the Court rejected, as insufficient
under Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment standards, a statistical
analysis concerning the application of the death penalty in Georgia."W
Conducted by David C. Baldus, an expert in the area of statistics and
criminal justice issues, the study used in McCeskey found that among
all of the factors that might influence ajury to impose the death pen-
alty, the race of the victim was the most consistent and central fac-
tor.'6 ' Without controlling for other factors, the defendant was eleven
times more likely to receive the death penalty if the victim was white
than if the victim was black.'62 Baldus's study, which considered 230
variables, including 39 non-racial variables, that could affect sentenc-
ing, demonstrated that the odds of a defendant receiving the death
penalty where the victim was white was 4.3 times higher than for a
black victim, a statistically significant number.1
63
The Court distinguished McCleskey's claim from venire-selection
and Title VII cases, where the courts have allowed statistics as proof of
discriminatory intent.' 6' In the Court's view, "the statistics relate[d]
to fewer entities, and fewer variables [were] relevant to the chal-
,,165lenged decisions. Batson was different from McCleskey's situation
because, "[r] equiring a prosecutor to rebut a study that analyzes the
past conduct of scores of prosecutors is quite different from requiring
a prosecutor to rebut a contemporaneous challenge to his own
acts. " "
The Court stated that the Baldus study showed only a "correla-
tion" between the race of the victim and the death penalty decision. 7
It is evident, however, that the study established far more that a "cor-
relation" between race and sentence; it demonstrated a strong causa-
tive relationship. The Court was simply unwilling to recognize the
degree to which race influenced jurors in capital cases, where such a
finding would call into question a large number of death penalties.
'5 Id. at 232-33.
19 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
160 d.
161 Id. at 286-87.
162 See id. at 286.
163 Id. at 287.
164 Id. at 294-95.
16, Id at 295.
1 Id. at 296, n.17. The Court further distinguished the venire selection and Title VII cases
on the ground that:
The decisions of ajury commission or of an employer over time are fairly attributable to
the commission or the employer. Therefore, an unexplained statistical discrepancy can
be said to indicate a consistent policy of the decisionmaker. The Baldus study seeks to
deduce a state "policy" by studying the combined effects of the decisions of hundreds of
juries that are unique in their composition. It is incomparably more difficult to deduce a
consistent policy by studying the decisions of these many unique entities.
Id. at 295, n.15.
167 Id. at 312.
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The Court also questioned how far the logic of the argument
would carry: the claim, Justice Powell stated, "throws into serious
question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice sys-
tem."'68 Unexplained by the Court was the acceptance of such dis-
crimination in the most serious decision made in the criminal courts,
notwithstanding the Court's insistence that it had engaged in "un-
ceasing efforts to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal justice
system,Ib justice Brennan commented that the Court's concern with
the implications of the statistics for other aspects of the criminal jus-
tice system displayed "a fear of too much justice." ' O
The Court took a similar hands-off approach in United States v.
Armstrong,171 where it reversed a ruling that would have permitted dis-
covery in support of a motion to dismiss federal crack cocaine prose-
cutions against black defendants on grounds of racially selective
prosecution.' 2 The defendants sought to prove discriminatory intent
by showing a racially disparate pattern of federal crack cocaine prose-
cutons. In a preliminary submission, the defendant showed that
every one of the twenty-four crack cocaine cases closed by the public
defender's office in 1991 involved a black defendant.'7
The government responded by setting forth race-neutral criteria
such as the quantity of drugs, firearms violations, the eidence, and
the criminal histories of the defendants.'" The government also
submitted part of a 1989 Drug Enforcement Administration report
stating that "[1]arge scale, interstate trafficking networks controlled
byJamaicans, Haitians and Black street gangs dominate the manufac-
ture and distribution of crack." 76 The defendants answered with affi-
davits asserting that there were an equal number of Caucasian and
minority users and dealers and that "many nonblacks are prosecuted
in state court for crack offenses."'
The Court ruled that the defendants were not entitled to disco-
ery because they "failed to satisfy the threshold showing... that the
Government declined to prosecute similarly situated suspects of other
races." 78 In a selective prosecution case, the Equal Protection Clause
requires a showing that similarly situated suspects of other races were
not prosecuted and "some evidence" of this essential proof must be
produced.' 9 The Court stated that prosecutors were entitled to a
16S Id at 314-15.
le Id at 309 (citation omitted).
10 Id. at 339 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
1 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
17 Id. at458, 470-71.
7 Id at 459.
174 Id.
11 I& at 460.
176 Id. (citation omitted).
- Id. at 460-61.
178 Id. at 458.
19 Id.
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presumption of the proper performance of their duties and relied
upon arrest statistics to reject the argument that blacks and whites
commit drugs offenses at rates that would not justify the highly dis-
proportionate federal prosecution of black crack cocaine offenders. 8'
As discussed above, these arrest data are suspect, but the Court,
which had so seriously questioned the data in McCleskey, and which
has condemned racial stereotyping in other contexts,'8' seemed un-
troubled in using these statistics to dismiss the claim of unfair racial
disparities in prosecutions. Thus, despite what appeared to be a rea-
sonable prima facie showing, even a limited request for discovery was
unavailing.
8 2
McCleskey and Armstrong are troubling, but are not dispositive of
racial profiling claims. In McCleskey the Court stressed the unique
discretion given to juries to decide between life and death in requir-
ing proof beyond statistical patterns for the system as a whole to show
that the judgment in an individual case was infected by intentional
discrimination. 8 3 It may be that courts will not permit the discrimina-
tory intent to be inferred from the judgment of disparate juries and
different prosecutors acting independently from each other, but will
find that statistical evidence that law enforcement officers repeatedly
target racial minorities is sufficient to establish a Fourteenth
180 Id at 464-69. The Supreme Court cited statistics compiled by the Sentencing Commis-
sion:
The Court of Appeals reached its decision in part because it started "with the presump-
tion that people of all races commit all types of crimes-not with the premise that any
type of crime is the exclusive province of any particular racial or ethnic group." 48 F.3d,
at 1516-1517. It cited no authority for this proposition, which seems contradicted by the
most recent statistics of the United States Sentencing Commission. Those statistics show:
More than 90% of the persons sentenced in 1994 for crack cocaine trafficking were
black, United States Sentencing Comm'n, 1994 Annual Report 107 (Table 45); 93.4% of
convicted LSD dealers were white, ibid.; and 91% of those convicted for pornography or
prostitution were white, id. at 41 (Table 13). Presumptions at war with presumably reli-
able statistics have no proper place in the analysis of this issue.
Id, at 469-70.
The Court's willingness to accept the proposition that rates of drug convictions by race and
type of substance reflect actual rates of drug possession or trafficking is inconsistent with em-
pirical data and Supreme Court pronouncements in related contexts. As the Attorneys General
of New Jersey and New York have concluded, drug arrest statistics are highly misleading. See
REPORT OF ATrORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK, supra note 46; INTERIM REPORT OF AIT-ORNEY
GENERAL OF NErOJERSEY, supra note 32. Further, as Professor Karlan has noted, in no other area
of equal protection jurisprudence has the Court been willing to make this kind of judgment.
Karlan, supra note 144, at 2024-25. Thus, the Court has rejected as demeaning the notion that
black voters "think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates
at the polls." Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-12 (1995) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 647 (1993)). See also, Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044, 1060 (2000) ("Under the Fifteenth
Amendment voters are treated not as members of a distinct race but as members of the whole
citizenry.").
181 See supra text accompanying notes 153-158.
182 Arnstrong; 517 U.S. at 470-71. For critical commentary on Arnstrong, see Richard Ff.
McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENmr L.
REV. 605 (1998).
183 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293-94, 308-11 (1987).
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Amendment claim. As the Court stated in AlcCleskcey
[T]he nature of the capital sentencing decision, and the relationship of
the statistics to that decision, are fundamentally different from the corre-
sponding elements in the venire-selection or Title VII [employment dis-
crimination] cases .... Each jury is unique in its composition, and the
Constitution requires that its decision rest on consideration of innumer-
able factors that vary according to the characteristics of the individual de-
fendant and the facts of the particular capital offense. '"
Armstrong's requirement that the defendant show that similarly
situated white offenders were not subjected to federal prosecution,
while questionable, should not bar selective policing claims. First, evi-
dence that shows statistically significant disparities in the rates at
which similarly situated black and white drivers are stopped and/or
searched pursuant to alleged traffic violations establishes the factual
predicate of similarly situated white drivers who have not been
stopped and searched."M
Second, Armstrong reaffirmed the rulings in Batson v. Kentuck,'-
and Yick Wo v. Hopkins,'8 that statistical proof is sufficient where a
challenged practice is characterized by a highly discretionary "selec-
ton procedure that is susceptible of abuse'IE3, or where discrimina-
tion is sufficiently "clandestine and covert" that evidence other than
naming white comparables is the "only available avenue of proof."'"
Several courts have sustained racial profiling equal protection claims
based on this order of proof." Where a racial profiling challenge is
based on the theory that official policy contains an express racial clas-
IN I& at 294.
1 See Hunter v. Undenood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (rel)ing on statistics in finding that a fa-
dally neutral disenfranchisement statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of die Fourteenth
Amendment).
186 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
197 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
1s8 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977).
1 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977) (citations
omitted). As the Court stated:
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative ... because such imbalance is
often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinanih to
be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force
more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of die population in lie
community from which employees are hired.
Id.
1 See, e-g., Rodriguez v. California Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (al-
lowing equal protection claim based in part on statistical evidence); Marland State Conference
of NAACP Branches v. Maryland Dep't of State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d 560 (D. Md. 199) (not-
ing that plaintiffs have standing based on continuing practice of racial profiling by police); Na-
tional Cong. for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York. 191 F.R.D. 52 (S.D.N.Y 19919) (holding
that allegation that police stopped and frisked black and Latino men based on their race and
national origin was sufficient to state equal protection claim, notwidstanding that complaint
failed to identify similarly situated non-minority individuals who were not stopped and frisked).
But see Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1065 (N.D. II1. 1998) (statistical eli-
dence alone w'as insufficient to satisfy "similarly situated" requirement applicable to equal pro-
tection claim).
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sification, there should be no need to plead or prove the existence of
a similarly situated non-minority group or person who was not subject
to the complained of practices. 19 As the Second Circuit recently ex-
plained:
[It is not necessary to plead the existence of a similarly situated non-
minority group when challenging a law or policy that contains an ex-
press, racial classification. These classifications are subject to strict judi-
cial scrutiny, see Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1998),
and strict scrutiny analysis in effect addresses the question of whether
people of different races are similarly situated with regard to the law or
policy at issue.'
Third, Armstrong was a selective prosecution case challenging a
prosecutor's discretion in deciding to charge particular defendants.""
As the Court emphasized, prosecutors are accorded a strong pre-
sumption in favor of the "regularity" of their decisions, rebuttable
only by "clear evidence to the contrary."094 Because of separation of
powers concerns, courts are "properly hesitant to examine the deci-
sion whether to prosecute."'95 There is no such presumption of cor-
rectness accorded to police officers charged with racial discrimina-
tion or other violations of constitutional norms in law enforcement
duties. 196
Equal Protection doctrine does not absolutely prohibit considera-
tion of race in enforcement or implementation of governmental
policies and a "compelling governmental interest" can justify the
practice.1 9 7  Certainly police can consider race where a physical de-
scription is provided, but absent that factor, or other self-limiting fac-
tors, race cannot be considered in the decision to stop, detain, or
search.9 9 Tactical deployment, surveillance operations, and policing
191 Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 2000); National Cong. for Puerto
Rican Rights v. City of NewYork, 191 F.R.D. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
192 Brown, 221 F.3d at 337.
193 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
194 Id. at 464.
195 Id. at 465.
196 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (voiding as vague a city ordinance
that prohibited "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places); Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (finding loitering statute void, because it "vests virtually com-
plete discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the
statute and must be permitted to go on his way in the absence of probable cause to arrest");
Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 813 (1974) (police prohibited from "using their authority as
peace officers to arrest, stop, disperse, or imprison [labor organizers] ... without 'adequate
cause'").
197 See City of Richmond v.JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,485 (1989) (citation omitted).
198 E.g., United States v. Alarcon-Gonzalez, 73 F.3d 289, 293 (10th Cir. 1996) (to detain sus-
pect for questioning, "police must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch."); United States v. Ornela&Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 717
(7th Cir. 1994) ("The 'suspicious' circumstances [relied upon by the police in stopping the de-
fendants would mean] ... that a very large proportion of all Hispanic Americans would be vul-
nerable to being stopped on suspicion of drug trafficking."); United States v. Anderson, 923
F.2d 450, 455 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Suspicions based solely on race of person stopped cannot give
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methods might well reflect responses to patterns of crime, and result
in more intrusive operations in minority communities, but race
should not warrant forcible stops or searches.
2. Title V7 and Disparate Impact
Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,""" regulations
promulgated by the Department ofJustice prohibit governmental ac-
ton that have a disparate impact by reason of race:
A recipient [of federal funds] ... may not... utilize criteria or methods
of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to dis-
crimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or have the
effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the ob-
jectives of the proram as respects individuals of a particular race, color,
or national origin.
rise to a reasonable suspicionjustifying a Teny stop." (citation omitted)). In United States r. Tay-
lor, 956 F.2d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 1992) (en bane) the dissent asserted:
The disproportionate number of Aftican-Americans who are stopped indicates that a ra-
cial imbalance against Afiican-Americans does exist and is implicitly sanctioned by the
law enforcement agency. The assumption that seventy-five percent of those persons
transporting drugs and other contraband through public modes of transportation are
African-American is impermissible. It flies in the face of reason and legitimates a nega-
tive stereotype of African-Americans. Surely, this practice must 'be subjected to the
strictest scrutiny and [can be] justified only by the weightiest of consideraions.
Id at 581 (KeithJ., dissenting) (citation omitted).
In United States v. llver, 966 F.2d 391, 392 (8th Cir. 1992). the court upheld a stop of a
black drug courier suspect at the Kansas City Airport based on infornation that 'a number of
young roughly dressed black males from street gangs in Los Angeles frequently brought cocaine
into the Kansas City area." Id. at 392-93. The court ruled that DEA agents can rely upon racial
characteristics if objective crime trend analysis validates use of these characteristics as 'risk fac-
tors' in predicting criminal activity. Id at 394. In the same view Los Angeles Police Chief Ber-
nard Parks has stated:
We have an issue of violent crime against jewelry salespeople .... The predominant sus-
pects are Colombians. We don't find Mexican-Alnericans, or blacks or other immigrants.
It's a collection of several hundred Colombians who commit this crime. If you see six in
a car in front of the Jewelry Mart, and they're waiting and ucatching people uith brief-
cases, should we play the percentages and follow them? It's common sense.
Goldberg, supra note 62.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976), upheld stops of persons at fixed
border checkpoints that were based in part on Mexican ancestry. However, in Unted States t
Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), the court ruled that it is impermissi-
ble to take Hispanic origin into account in stops in Southern California. The court noted both
significant "demographic changes" and "changes in the law restricting the use of race as a crite-
rion in government decision-making." Id. at 1134.
199 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994) provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or actiity receiving Federal
financial assistance." See also, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.42 L'.S.C. §
3789(c) (repealed 1984) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of race, color, national origin.
sex, or religion by law enforcement agencies that receive federal funding).
2 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (1999). The regulations also require that "[el'r application
for Federal financial assistance ... shall, as a condition to its approval and the extension of any
Federal financial assistance ... contain or be accompanied by an assurance that the program
.%ill be conducted.., in compliance with all requirements imposed by or pursuant to this sub-
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Whether private parties may enforce this regulation through an
implied right of action similar to that authorized by Cort v. Ash," was
recently addressed in Powell v. Ridge,"2 where the court set forth a
three part test for determining whether Title VI regulations were en-
forceable by private parties: (1) whether a private cause of action ex-
ists under the enabling statute; (2) whether the agency rule is prop-
erly within the scope of the statute; and (3) whether implying a cause
of action will further the purposes of the statute.03 Title VI does
permit private enforcement,"" and the Department of Justice regula-
tion appears to be well within the scope of the enabling statute. In
Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, 20 regulations prohibit-
ing discriminatory effects were approved by a majority of the Court.00
And in Alexander v. Choate20' a unanimous Court confirmed that: "Ti-
tle VI has delegated to the agencies in the first instance the complex
determination of what sorts of disparate impacts upon minorities
constituted sufficiently significant social problems, and were readily
enough remediable, to warrant altering the practices of the federal
grantees that had produced those impacts.""'o
Since Guardians and Choate, federal courts of appeals have consis-
tently found that Title VI implementing regulations prohibiting prac-
tices that cause an unjustified disparate impact provide a basis for
private plaintiffs to sue recipients of federal funds on a discriminatory
effects theory, without a showing of discriminatory intent.209
Private enforcement of such regulations will further the purposes
of the statute. Title VI "sought to accomplish two related, but never-
part." 28 C.F.R. § 42.105(a)(1) (1999).
201 422 U.S. 66, 74-77 (1975) (discussing standards for determining whether a right of action
should be implied under a federal statute).
189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999).
203 Id at 397-98.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 710-16 (1979); Cf. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197
F.3d 484 (11 th Cir. 1999) (upholding private challenge under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964), cert. granted sub nom. Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 28 (2000) (accepting petition of
certiorari challenging Title VI ruling).
205 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
See 463 U.S. at 584 n.2 (White, J.); id. at 623 n.15 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 642-45
(Stevens, Brennan, Blackmun,JJ., dissenting).
207 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
208 Id at 293-94.
2W See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that regulations promul-
gated under Title VI prohibiting discriminatory effects in educational programs gave rise to an
implied private right of action); Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Self, 132
F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that a private right of action exists under Tide VI regulations),
cert. granted 524 U.S. 915, vacated as moot, 524 U.S. 974 (1998); Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481,
486 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that while Hispanic parents had a private cause of action under
Title VI to challenge decision of school district to close neighborhood elementary schools and a
open new charter school, because parents failed to show a disparate impact, their claims were
denied); New York Urban League, Inc. v. State of New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036-37 (2d Cir.
1995) (noting that riders of the New York City Transit Authority subway and bus system, the
majority of whom are members of protected minority groups, had a private cause of action tin-
der Title VI).
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theless somewhat different, objectives. First, Congress w-anted to
avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminator), practices;
second, it wanted to provide individual citizens effective protection
against those practices."2 1 1 In enacting the regulations, the Depart-
ment of Justice determined that "disparate impacts upon minorities
constituted sufficiently significant social problems, and were readily
enough remediable, to warrant altering the practices of the federal
grantees that had produced those impacts."
2 1'
A plaintiff seeking to enforce the regulations must also establish
standing given the particular state program and plaintiffs relation-
ship to that program. Most state and local police agencies receive
federal funds and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 defines
"program or activity" to include all the operations of a governmental
department or agency which receives federal funds.2 "  Using this
definition of "activity or program," traffic stops, searches, and arrests
should be covered.
Whether a plaintiff has to demonstrate that she was a direct par-
ticipant in or intended beneficiary of a covered "program or activity"
in order to assert a claim under Title VI is not clear, but even if that
were so, Title VI should still apply to traffic and pedestrian stops.
The statute, as well as its implementing regulation, provides that
"[n]o person... be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance."" Were standing to be
restricted only to direct beneficiaries or participants, claims asserted
by persons "subjected to" discrimination by a federally funded entity
who did not fall into either category would fail. The language of Ti-
tle VI, however, prohibits any discriminatory conduct against an indi-
vidual member of a protected class by a covered entity, including ac-
tions of a police officer. "[T]he plain meaning of 'activity' is a
'natural or normal function or operation' . . . . It is a catch-all phrase
that prohibits all discrimination by a public entity, regardless of the
context."
214
210 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
21 Choate, 469 U.S. at 293-94. There is substantial evidence of congressional intent 1o permit
private plaintiffs to enforce the discriminatory effects standard set forth in Title VI regulations.
Since Guardians and Choate were decided, Congress has amended Title VI to broaden the scope
of the statute's coverage while acknowledging the existence of a privately enforceable discrimi-
natory effects standard. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,42 U.S.C. § 2000d-la(l) (1994).
212 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)-4a (1994). Sv, Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107, 115 (3d Cir. 1999j
(finding that the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 applies only to specific programs receiving
federal aid).
213 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (emphasis added)
214 Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of Nhite Plains, 117 F.3d 37,44-115 (2d Cir. 1997) (cita-
tions omitted). See also Bryant v. NewJersey Dep't of Transp., 998 F. Supp. 438 (D.NJ. 1998)
(holding that African-American residents whose homes may be destroyed as a result of a feder-
ally funded highway project allegedly allocated in a discriminatory manner had standing under
Title VI).
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Finally, racial profiling plaintiffs come within the scope of pruden-
tial standing limits. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the"zone of interests" test as a prudential limitation on standing in the
context of an action brought under the Administrative Procedure
Act. As the Court has articulated that test:
The proper inquiry is simply "whether the interest sought to be protected
by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be pro-
tected.., by the statute." Hence, in applying the "zone of interests" test,
we do not ask whether, in enacting the statutory provision at issue, Con-
gress specifically intended to benefit the plaintiff. Instead, we first dis-
cern the interests "arguably... to be protected" by the statutory provi-
sion at issue; we then inquire whether the plaintiff's interests affected by
the agency action in question are among them.
Disparate impact theory avoids the difficult burden of proof of in-
tentional discrimination. Statistical evidence of the type assembled
in New Jersey, Maryland, and Illinois would be sufficient to put the
burden of'justification for the use of racial characteristics on the law
enforcement agency and would require substantial evidence as to the
necessity and efficacy of racial profiling in the highway drug courier
context.
217
B. Pedestrian Stops
The surge of attention to racial profiling on the highways has led
to concern as well over similar police practices in stops of pedestrians
and other travelers. Pedestrian stops, frisks and searches present
some comparable legal issues. Thus, while the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and Title VI standards discussed above will govern pedestrian
stops as well, the policing interests and Fourth Amendment standards
differ in significant respects from car stops and searches.
215 National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 492 (1998)
(citations omitted). See also, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 120 S. Ct.
693 (2000) (holding that environmental plaintiffs adequately alleged injury in fact, for standing
purposes, when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons for whom the aesthetic
and recreational values of the area will be lessened by the challenged activity).
216 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that intentional discrimina-
tion need not be shown under a Title VI claim).
217 See Rodriguez v. California Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1140-42 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(finding that statistical evidence could be used by plaintiffs in a racial profiling case to support
claim based on an equal protection violation). Of course, the United States may invoke Title VI
regulations directly to terminate federal funding of police departments that engage in practices
that result in unjustified disparate impact on racial minorities. As I discuss below, in the past
year the Department ofJustice, pursuant to powers provided by Congress in 1994 to sue to en-
join unconstitutional patterns and practices by law enforcement agencies, has obtained consent
decrees in New Jersey and Montgomery County, Maryland, that prohibit racial profiling on
highways.
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1. Police Practices and Interests
Pedestrian stops are at the very core of policing. They are used to
enforce narcotics and weapons laws, to identify fugitives or other per-
sons for whom warrants may be outstanding, to investigate reported
crimes and "suspicious" behavior, and to improve community "quality
of life." They are also designed to secure intelligence information
about criminal activities and to establish a police presence in, and
physical control of, certain communities. The type of patrol sends a
very strong message to the community, and stop and frisk practices
are a key element of order-maintenance policing. As the New York
Attorney General has reported:
Order maintenance theory encourages officers to intervene in instances
of low-level disorder, whether observed or suspected, with approaches
which fall short of arrest. A "stop" intervention provides an occasion for
the police to have contact with persons presumably involved in low-level
criminality--without having to effect a formal arrest, and under a lower
constitutional standard (i.e., "reasonable suspicion"). Indeed, because
low-level "quality of life" and misdemeanor offenses are more likely to be
committed in the open, as a theoretical matter, dhe "reasonable suspi-
cion" standard may be more readily satisfied as to those sorts of crimes.
To the extent that "stop" encounters create points of contact between po-
lice and low-level offenders, such contacts can lead to the apprehension
of persons already wanted for more serious crimes, or who might be pre-
pared to commit them in the near future.
The pedestrian stop can be triggered by any number of diverse
factors, although as a legal matter the police cannot forcibly stop or
detain persons without reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal
conduct may be afoot. 9 The complex and protean nature of street
investigations, from both racial and crime control perspectives, makes
legal and political judgments in this field highly controversial. The
Supreme Court has addressed these issues in numerous cases over the
years and has developed a methodology for balancing law enforce-
ment and privacy interests.' This article is not the occasion to ana-
lyze or critique this very large body of case law (which is the subject of
extensive commentary);22' rather, the focus will be on the relevance to
218 REPoRToFAIToRNEYGENERALOFNEWYoRK, supra note 46. at 57.
219 Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
The standards under the Fourth Amendment are far easier to state than to appis in spe-
cific factual contexts. In summary, consensual encounters between the police and civilians ide-
fined as situations where a reasonable person would feel free to decline to answer questons or
to leave the area) can be made without any showing of cause or suspicion. imestigathe stops
(forced stops where an individual is not free to leave) may be effectuated upon 'reasonable
suspicion" of criminal conduct, a frisk (protective pat down for the officer's protection, but not
as a search for contraband) is permissible incident to an investigative detention i.iere the offi-
cer has articulable grounds for such action, and an arrest and full scale search are justified onl%
upon a showing of probable cause. Se gneral, WAYNE R. LkF.AVF. SF-utui %,\D SEIZ.tP: .
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (3d ed. 1996).
221 E.g., Terry v. Ohio 30 Years Later: A Symposium on the Fourth Artnzr.rrmml. Lau, Enjimer.ndt
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Fourth Amendment doctrine of the empirical data that has been col-
lected with respect to pedestrian stop practices.
Law enforcement officials maintain that there is a direct relation-
ship between the degree of discretion they may exercise in stops,
frisks, and questioning of individuals, and the effectiveness of their
crime fighting and intelligence efforts.22 Of course, the greater the
police power, the greater is the potential for abuse. And it is pre-
cisely at this intersection of crime, race and, police stop and frisk
practices that the underlying social and legal conflicts most often are
manifested, and not infrequently in sharp and violent confrontations.
On February 4, 1999, in New York City, one of these incidents ex-
ploded in controversy and generated a searching inquiry into the na-
ture of these police street practices, with particular emphasis on their
impact on people of color. On that date four plain-clothed officers
from the elite Street Crimes Unit, observed Amadou Diallo in the ves-
tibule of his apartment building and decided to investigate his night-
time appearance at that location. 23 As they approached, Diallo re-
mained in the vestibule with a wallet in one hand and the police,
claiming that they thought the wallet was a gun and that Diallo had
been acting "suspiciously," started shooting; forty-one bullets were
fired and nineteen penetrated Diallo's body.2 24 The death of Diallo,
an immigrant street peddler with no criminal record and carrying no
weapons, brought to a head the long simmering controversy over ag-
gressive New York policing practices and led to widespread demon-
strations and protests of racially-biased policing25
In the public debate, comparisons were inevitably drawn between
the Diallo killing and the sadistic torture by New York police officers
of Abner Louima some nineteen months earlierY.6  But whatever
similarities exist between the two incidents on reference points of
race and police aggressiveness, no one contends that the type of bru-
tality in the Louima affair was anything but criminal. The killing of
Diallo, however, has evoked reactions ranging from criminal indict-
ment to a defense that the incident, while tragic, was an aberrant by-
and Police-Citizen Encounters, 72 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 721 (1998).
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 225-227.
24 Id.
225 See, e.g., Dan Barry & Marjorie Connelly, Poll in New York Finds Many Think Police Are Biased,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1999, at Al; Michael Cooper, Safir May Use Data on Frisks to Back Unit, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 1999, at BI (reporting that the NewYork City Police Commissioner was attempt-
ing to deflect attacks that stops and frisks were racially biased); Robert. D. McFadden, Four Offi-
cers Indicted for Murder in Killing of Diallo, Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIES, Mar. 26, 1999, at Al (noting
that the killing had led to a storm of protests against the police). On February 25, 2000 all four
officers were acquitted on the criminal charges. Jane Fritsch, 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting are Ac-
quitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at Al. See also, Kevin Flynn, Shooting Raises Scru-
tiny of Police Anti-Drug Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2000, at Al (reporting criticism of narcotics
enforcement in the wake of shooting of Patrick Dorismond, an unarmed man).
226 E.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, ThePerils of Safety, THE NEw YORKER, Mar. 22, 1999, at 50.
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product of an essential police practice.
7
Brutality, however effective in establishing police hegemony, can-
not be defended in a democratic society.- By contrast, aggressive
street patrol is defended as an essential element of urban policing
and the inevitable abuses that occur in the course of this police work
are presented as costs to be endured if crime is to be effectively con-
trolled. The contours of this debate were captured well by Elizabeth
Kolbert:
If you are a black resident of New York City, your chances of being mur-
dered are at least five times as high as they are if you are white, and the
odds that you've been arrested for murder are more than ten times as
high. This disparity means that the police ill see more behavior by
blacks that they will legitimately identify as suspicious. At the same time,
it means that they will, almost inevitably, come to see criminal behavior as
a black phenomenon, which is not only profoundly unfair but also unlaw-
ful. The more aggressive policing becomes-the more the cops try to an-
ticipate crimes before they occur-the more such structural biases are
brought out into the open.
Of course, the segregation of crime, by income, by neighborhood,
and, especially, by race, is what makes such strategy politically practical in
the first place. Crucial constituencies have little directly to lose from it.
The cost of aggressive policing may be a collective erosion of civil rights,
but only some groups feel the immediate impact.
227 E.g.,Joyce Purnick, Central Issue is Left Unsaid in Diallo Case N.Y. TIMES. Feb. 21, 2000, at
BI (suggesting that the aggressive tactics used by the Street Crime Unit of the New York Police
Department was a major factor in the death of Diallo); Clyde Haberman, Wen Dong Wrong lsn't
Wrongdoing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2000, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3 (reporting the spectrum of
public responses in the wake of the jury acquittal of the police officers charged in the killing of
Diallo).
Patterns of brutality, even torture, are not mere vestiges of the past. In recent years. ei-
dence of brutal and sadistic conduct by officers and groups of officers in major police depart-
ments across the country have demonstrated how insidious are these practices. Se. Bandes, su-
pra note 67, at 1307-09 (analyzing ways in which the courts and other institutions have avoided
confronting institutional patterns of police misconduct by reducing evidence to anecdotes);
Todd S. Purdum, Los Angeles Police Officer Sets Off Corruption Sranda. N.Y. TIMES. Sept. 18. 1999,
at A9 (reporting that a dozen police officers were suspended after an investigation uncovered
cases in which the police had shot an unarmed and handcuffed gang member, and then framed
him); see also, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF THE Los 'IGELES POUcE
DEPARTMENr (1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION] (reporting on the excessive use
of force in the Los Angeles Police Department in the wake of the Rodney King beatingl;
REPORT OF THE CITY OF NEv YORK COtMIsSIoN TO INvEsTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POUCE
CORRUPTION AND THE ANrfI-CoRRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE PoLIcE DEPARTMENT (July 7.
1994) (Milton Mollen, Chair) [hereinafter MOLI.EN COMMISSION], nprnted rn 6 NEW YORK Cmt
PoucE CORRUPTION INwESTIGATION COMMISSIONS, 1894-1994 (GabrielJ. Chin ed.. 1997) (inves-
tigating police corruption in the New York City police department). Police officials are almost
always quick to deny allegations of brutality, and the code of silence and other entrenched
practices in the police culture often make it difficult to prove these matters. Myrian E. Gilles,
Breaking the Code of Silence." Rediscovering 'Custom" in Section 1983 Muniapal Ltabdty, 80 B.U. L
REV. 17 (2000).
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[P]eople sense, if only intuitively, the fundamental difference be-
tween the [Louima and Diallo] cases. Allegedly, as the cops beat Louima
in their squad car on the way to the station and then tortured him inside
it, they taunted him with racial epithets. The very explicitness of their
racism was something to condemn, but also to take some comfort in:
What those cops did to Louima, you could tell yourself, clearly had noth-
ing to do with doing their job. It is much harder to say that about Di-
allo.2
The constitutional seeds of this controversy were planted more
than 30 years ago when the Supreme Court first decided how the
Fourth Amendment would be applied to the street stop and frisk.
Decided at a time of urban turmoil, bitter police/minority commu-
nity relationships, and deep social conflict on a wide range of issues,
the Court's opinion in Terry v. Ohio230 established a doctrinal frame-
work that has endured to this day. The Court ruled that a stop is
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment if the facts and circum-
stances made known to the officer provide grounds for an objectively
reasonable belief that criminal activity may be afoot.2"' Further, the
Court decided that if the officer had a reasonable belief that the per-
son stopped was "armed and dangerous," a pat-down frisk could be
conducted, again on less than probable cause.232 In some respects,
this approach is the street equivalent to the Whren pretext doctrine
for cars: just as the police use the traffic stop to place themselves in a
position to search the vehicle and occupants, they use the stop of pe-
destrians to gain the opportunity to frisk.
The Court recognized the abuses that attend stop and frisk prac-
tices, including possible disproportionate impact on racial minorities,
Kolbert, supra note 226, at 50, 56-57; see, Brent Staples, Editorial, How a Black Man's Wallet
Becomes a 'Gun,'N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2000, § 4 (Week in Review), at 14 ("The root of the prob-
lem is the tendency of white police officers-and white Americans generally-to associate
blackness with criminality .....
230 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
231 I& at 30.
232 I& at 27. See generally, 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.4(a), 137-43, 9.5(a), 246-70 (3d ed. 1996). Over the years, the Court
has expanded the power to stop and frisk. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989)
(drug enforcement agents had reasonable suspicion to conduct investigative stop of suspected
drug courier who flew from Honolulu and spent 48 hours in Miami, paid for two plane tickets
with $2,100 from roll of $20 bills containing nearly twice that much; never checked his luggage,
and agents had reasonable ground to believe that suspected courier was traveling under an
alias); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (holding that a twenty-minute detention of
a criminal suspect is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411 (1981) (holding that stop based on "inferences and deductions that might elude an
untrained person" was justified on less than probable cause); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972) (holding that where an informant had advised a police officer that an individual seated
in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist, that the officer acted justi-
fiably in reaching in and removing a loaded gun from the occupant's waistband after the occu-
pant had rolled down his window rather than complying with the officer's request to open the
car door). But see, Florida v.J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000) (anonymous tip of man with gun is an
insufficient basis for stop and frisk).
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but thought that there was little that it could do to control these prac-
tices through the exclusionary rule.m After having ignored the racial
factors in the case, 2 the Court addressed the role that aggressive
stop and frisk practices have on racial tensions between the police
and minority communities:
We have noted that the abusive practices which play a major, though by
no means exclusive, role in creating this friction are not susceptible to
control by means of the exclusionary rule, and cannot properly dictate
our decision with respect to the powers of the police in genuine investi-
gative and preventive situations. However, the degree of community re-
sentment aroused by particular practices is clearly relevant to an assess-
ment of the quality of the intrusion upon reasonable expectations of
personal security caused by those practices.2
The Court's observations of the racial tensions that surround stop
and frisk practices in minority communities were not unique. Gov-
ernmental commissions, law enforcement officials, and community
organizers were asserting similar views: and, while the Court soon
cast a blind eye to this issue, thirty years after Ter the conflict be-
tween law enforcement and racial minorities continues to be raw and
pronounced. "7 Over this period of time, the Court has significantly
expanded police powers (in many cases in deference to the "War on
Drugs")2s and complaints concerning racial bias and random, arbi-
trary stop and frisks have continued to mounLt
392 U.S. at 13-15.
2M Se, Thompson, supra note 25, at 966-68 (discussing testimony that established that two of
the three men thought to be acting suspiciously were black, a fact that first led the officer to
observe their conduct).
Terq, 392 U.S. at 17 n.14.
M .. g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADvISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DIsORDERS (1968)
(KERNER CO.MMISSION); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON L-, w F-NFORCF-IENST
" 
.XD ADILMLTRATION
OFISTICFE, TASKFORCE REPORT: THE POLICE (1967).
The Court's refusal to consider racial bias in the development of Fourth Amendment doc-
trine is well documented. E.g., Maclin, Race, supra note 25, at 336-38; Thompson. supra, note
25, at 962-83; Sklansky, supra note 25, at 316-17. At the same time, tie evidence of the corrosive
impact of racial bias in street level policing has been similarly well documented. E.g..
CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION supra note 228; MOLLEN COMMISSION supra note 22-8 KEN-.MDY. su-
pra note 76.
. See, eg., Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct 673, 676 (2000) (holding that flight of individual
from police is a strong factor to be considered in determining reasonableness of stop); labama
v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (holding that anonymous telephone up, corroborated by inde-
pendent police work, provided reasonable suspicion to make investigatory stop of defendant's
vehicle); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that stopping a suspect based on
drug courier profile was reasonable under Fourth Amendment standard); Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that consent to a search can be voluntary even if suspect
did not know that he could refuse search); Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (holding
that a police officer making a reasonable stop can conduct a limited protective search for weap-
ons); David Rudovsky, The Impad of the War on Drugs on Proadural Fairnmc and Razial Equaliit.
1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237 (1994) (arguing that judicial deference to aggressive police tactics in
the War on Drugs has had a negative impact on certain constitutional principles).
M-3 E.g., Macin, Race, supra note 25, at 33638; MOLmE COMMISSION. supra note 228.
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The Court recently addressed the justifications for a Teny stop in a
case where the police sought to4 ustify a stop and frisk primarily on
the basis of flight of the suspect.2  According to the police testimony,
as a police caravan of four cars investigating drug trafficking in a
"high crime" neighborhood passed, the defendant Wardlow looked
in the direction of the officers and immediately fled, carrying an241
opaque bag. A stop and frisk of the defendant disclosed a hand-
gun. 42 The Supreme Court rejected the state's claim for a per se rule
that flight would always justify a stop, but held that evidence of un-
provoked flight was a factor that could be considered, among others,
as to whether there is reasonable suspicion to believe that an individ-
ual was involved in criminal activity.
2 4
The Court recognized that flight may be perfectly innocent activ-
ity ("not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing"), but is "certainly sug-
gestive [of wrongdoing] .44 The Court conceded that there was no
empirical evidence concerning the relationship of flight to criminal
activity, but repeated its prior rulings that reasonable suspicion de-
pends upon "commonsense judgments and inferences about human
behavior., 245 Terry itself "accepts the risk that officers may stop inno-
cent people,"2 46 but the burden of showing something more than an
"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch' of criminal ac-
tivity" is all that is required by the Fourth Amendment.2 47
The majority ignored arguments concerning possible racial bias in
the consideration of ambiguous factors like flight and presence in a
high crime area.248 Further, the Court did not consider whether mi-
norities might be more likely to flee upon the arrival of police. By
contrast, the dissent specifically pointed to the belief, "particularly
[among] minorities," that contact with the police could be dangerous
even for innocent persons, and cited to law enforcement investiga-
tions, including those of the Attorneys General of New Jersey and
Massachusetts, regarding racial profiling and stops without cause. 9
Justice Stevens noted that news reports in New York demonstrated
"that society as a whole is paying a significant cost in infringement of
liberty by these virtually random stops."
251
240 Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000).
241 Id at 674-75. The officer could not recall whether the cars were marked. Id. at 683 (Stev-
ensJ., dissenting).
Id. at 675.
243 Id. at 676-77.
244 Id at 676.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 677.
247 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
248 Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense Fund at 4-5, 17-19, Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S.
Ct. 673 (2000) (No. 98-1036).
249 120 S. Ct. at 680 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
250 Id. at 680-81, nn.8, 9 and 10 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
25! Id at 680-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' comment that African-Americans
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The Wardlow opinions simply pass each other by on the crucial is-
sues of race and the relevance of empirical data on the standards that
should control Fourth Amendment stop and frisk adjudication. What
weight, if any, the Court would give to empirical evidence regarding
the influence of race or the measurable relationship between alleged
"suspicious" behavior and actual criminal conduct is not consid-
ered.s
Scholarly commentary on the Court's stop and frisk jurisprudence
has addressed the remarkable retreat from consideration of racial
impact, but has often proceeded without attention to empirical data.
A symposium entitled "Teny v. Ohio 30 Years Later," " presented
analysis by 30 prominent judges, scholars and lawyers, of the legal
and political impact of Tery and its progeny. These presentations re-
flected longstanding divisions over competing Fourth Amendment
theory,"7 including the relevance of race in police street detentions.2'
But in the absence of empirical data, the articles did not address the
racial impact or the Fourth Amendment compliance rate of Ten.
may tend to fear police more than whites, id., received very little attention. By contrast. Federal
DistrictJudge Harold Baer was vilified for suppressing evidence in a narcotics case in an opin-
ion that discounted the flight of the suspect from police on the ground that residents of minor-
ity communities in New York City may believe the police to be -corrupt, abusive and violent."
See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). After calls for his impeach-
ment, eg., Stephen B. Bright, Political Atiadis on theJuditiar.: Can Just ie hI Done Arnd Efforts to
Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y. U. L REV. 308, 310-11
(1997), Judge Baer vacated his ruling. United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), affd, 201 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000).
2 Judgments as to the relevancy and weight that should be assigned to particular human
behavior are necessarily often subjective and imprecise. The Federal Rules of Evidence define
as "relevant" any evidence that has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact thnt is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable." FED. R. E'iD.
401. This extremely broad definition allows for the "common sense judgnments" the Court ap-
proved of in Wardlvu, but also for consideration of empirical and statistical data. See Frost v.
Symington, 197 F.3d 348,356 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Scientific studies can have a corrective effect by
establishing an apparently implausible connection or refuting an apparently obvious one, but.
subject to such corrections, conformity to commonsensical intuitihe judgments is a standard
element of both reasonableness and rationality." (citation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Santoli,
680 N.E.2d 1116 (Mass. 1997) (noting social science studies that show that there is no relation-
ship between strength of the belief of the accuracy of one's identification and the actual accu-
racy of the identification in holding thatjury instructions could not include a statement that the
strength of identification may be taken into consideration in determining accuracy).
Z3 72 ST.JoHN's L. RE%. 721 (1998).
E.g., Maclin, Terry v. Ohio, supra note 144; Akhil Reed Anmr, Tern and Fourth Arnrndrrat
irst Principles, 72 ST. JOHN'S L RExv. 1097 (1998) (discussing the conflicting understandings of
the Teny decision); Christopher Slobogin, Ld Not Buny Terry: A Callfor Rejutnation of the Pro-
portionaity Prindpe 72 ST.JOHN'S L REv. 1053 (1998) (promoting a conceptual frameuork for
the Fourth Amendment based on the "proportionality principle").
M Several of the articles discussed the racial tensions surrounding the stop and frisk prac-
tices, eg., Maclin, Terry v. Ohio, supra note 144;Jack B. Weinstein & Mac C. Quinn, Terry, Rate
andJudidal Integri,: The Court and Suppression Durng the War on Drgs. 72 ST. JOtt'S L RE'.
1323 (1998), and others addressed application of the doctrine in lower court adjudication, e.g.,
George C. Thomas, Ill, Terry v. Ohio in the Trteies: A Glimpse at How Cours App.s "Reasanabe
Suspicion, "72 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 1025, 1026-27 (1998).
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stops and frisks. Whether or not Terry represents "A Practically Perfect
Doctrine,,256 cannot be answered on a purely theoretical level. Empiri-
cal evidence concerning the points of tension in Terry ' balance of the
needs of law enforcement, the privacy and autonomy rights of indi-
viduals, and the imperative of racial equality, is an essential element
of the constitutional calculus.
Studies of pedestrian stops have been undertaken in New York
City and Philadelphia. The Philadelphia study was made pursuant to
a Settlement Agreement in a class action lawsuit against the Philadel-
phia Police Department that was filed in the wake of a federal crimi-
nal investigation that uncovered systemic corruption and misconduct
in narcotics enforcement. The study considered stops of pedestrians
and cars for selected periods and for selected police districts in
Philadelphia in 1997.157 For one-week periods in March and October,
1997, for four police districts in the City, every police-recorded stop
of a car or a pedestrian was entered into a computer data base. "s The
data were then analyzed to determine whether there were racial pat-
terns of enforcement and whether police were exercising their stop
and frisk power with sufficient cause or suspicion. 9 The findings,
though tentative in nature, raised serious questions concerning racial
profiling and suspicionless stops and frisks. For example, in the
Eighteenth District (West Philadelphia), where African-Americans
constitute 70.3% of the population, for all pedestrian stops reported
by the police for two different one-week periods in 1998, African-
Americans were 93% of those stopped; whites constituted 4.7% of the
stops. 26° Of the 214 stops of African-Americans pedestrians during
these periods, 135 were conducted without a legally sufficient written• 261
explanation.
In the Eighth Police District, where the population was 91.2%
white and 6.5% African-American, African-Americans constituted
26.8% of all those stopped. 62 Moreover, in this district, while a suffi-
cient reason was provided by the police for approximately 40% of all
whites stopped, only 15% of African-Americans were stopped with a
25 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOtlN's L. REV. 911
(1998).
25 Fourth Philadelphia Report, supra note 41, at 1. It should be noted that there is even less
reliable information made available by police departments concerning racial demographics and
"cause" for pedestrian stops and frisks than for car stops and searches. Many departments re-
quire reports only when an arrest occurs and no department to my knowledge maintains a
computer data base of this information. Indeed, in the two studies discussed in this Article, the
information regarding pedestrian stops had to be individually transferred from handwritten
police forms to computerized data fields.
Id. at 1-4.
219 I.
260 Id. at 21-22, 26-27.
261 Id. at 26-27. The police reporting form (the "75-48") requires the officer to provide a rea-
son for any stop, frisk or arrest. Id. at 1-7.
262 Fourth Philadelphia Report, supra note 41, at 28.
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stated legally sufficient reason.2
While the statistical analysis did not control for crime rates and
police deployment, the two factors that police officials and others
have regularly cited as the primary reasons for any disparities in the
gross numbers,26 the study pointed to two sets of data that could be
interpreted to show racial bias in street stops and frisks. First, the
same patterns of highly disproportionate stops of minority drivers
and pedestrians were observed.2 Second, in stops in which the po-
lice failed to provide any reason for their intervention, the racial dis-
parity was greater than for stops made with a recorded reason. Still,
the Report recognized the need for further data collection and analy-
Sis.
267
On the issue of whether there were sufficient grounds under the
Fourth Amendment and state constitutional principles for the stops
and frisks, the data showed that over one-third of all stops either
failed to state any reason for the police action or, if stated, the rea-
sons were manifestly inadequate under governing constitutional
standards.s In deference to the Police Department's response that
many officers were simply not properly filling out the forms, as op-
posed to not having proper reasons for the stops, no conclusive find-
ings were suggested. Commissioner Timoney has stated that the De-
partment's review of stop data under the new police policies and
practices shows a 50% reduction in the number of stops over comparable
time periods.269 This dramatic drop has occurred during a period of
high numbers of arrests.2" Significantly, the percentage reduction
correlates with the large number of improper stops made under the
"old regime." ' A study of the stops and arrests made during a one-
week period in July, 1999, after the reporting form and new training
had been implemented, demonstrated continued evidence of racial
Id.
Z64 See, eg., New York City Police Commissioner Howard Safir, Statement to the New York
City Council Public Safety Committee (Apr. 19, 1999).
26 Fourth Philadelphia Report, supra note 41, at 18-28.
266 1Id.
M Id. at 31. The Report was issued at the time that a new Commisioner.John Timonv. %was
appointed to head the Police Department. Commissioner Timoney ordered that a revised form
be developed for recording stops and frisks and that officers be specially trained uith respect to
their responsibilities in accurately recording all stops of cars and pedestrians. Fifth Philadel-
phia Report, supra note 41, at 4-10.
Fourth Philadelphia Report, supra note 41. at 10. For the Narcotics Strike Force, 57% of
the recorded stops were facially deficient under the Fourth Amendment id. at 13. As I discuss
below, it is both ironic and disturbing that it is the officers often credited %ith the most "exper-
tise" who most frequently make stops of innocent persons.
209 Francis X. Clines, Philadelphia Police Chief Borouws from Bronx Beat, N.Y. TtES.Jan. 16, 2000,
§ 1, at16.
20 E.g., Mark Fazloilah, Arests in Rapes Up 46% in 1999. PHILL IXQLIRER., Mar. 20. 2000, at A-
1.
lFourth Philadelphia Report, supa note 41. at 12-13.
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bias in this area of police work 2  In comparing the stops of African-
Americans in largely black police districts to stops made in largely
white districts, the statistical data showed hugely disproportionate
stops by race in the white areas of the City, while stops in African-
American areas were roughly proportionate to the population in
those areas. In some areas, there were more than ten times more
stops of African-Americans as one would expect from the racial com-
position of the residential population.74
In 1999, the Attorney General of New York State conducted a
study of 175,000 stops made by New York City police over a fifteen-
month period in 1998_1999.27 This study was both broader in scope
(analyzing every recorded stop made by the New York City Police De-
partment for the 15 months), and statistically more sophisticated in
its analysis of the data, including the use of regression analyses in its
review of racial data, to ensure that the racial disparities reflected in
the gross numbers were not explained by other factors, including dif-
ferential crime rates among racial groups.276 The results of this study
parallel the findings made in Philadelphia and present compelling
empirical data of racial profiling and large numbers of stops without
legal justification. The Attorney General made the following find-
ings:
During the covered period, minorities-and blacks in particular-
were stopped at a higher rate than whites, relative to their respective
percentages within the population of New York City. Specifically, the
Attorney General found:
1. Blacks comprise 25.6% of the City's population, yet 50% of all
177persons "stopped" during the period were blackY. Hispanics com-
prise 23.7% of the City's population, yet 33% of all "stops" were of
278Hispanics. By contrast, whites are 43.4% of the City's population,
but accounted for only 12.9% of all "stops."
2 79
2. This disparity in stop rates is particularly pronounced in pre-
cincts where the majority of the population is white.2 0 In precincts in
which blacks and Hispanics each represent less than 10% of the total
population, individuals identified as belonging to these racial groups
nevertheless accounted for more than half of the total "stops" during
the covered period.2 8' Blacks accounted for 30% and Hispanics ac-
272 Plaintiffs' Fifth Monitoring Report, supra note 41, at 1-2, 9-10, 20-26.
273 Id. at 20-25.
274 Id. at 26-27.
275 REPORT OFATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEWYORK, supra note 46, at 88.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 94.
278 Id.
"2 Id. at 94-95.
290 Id. at 106.
281 1I
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counted for 23.4% of all persons "stopped" in these precincts.'
3. Precincts where minorities constitute the majority of the over-
all population tended to see more stop and frisk activity. Of the ten
precincts showing the highest rate of "stop and frisk" activity (meas-
ured by "stops" per 1,000 residents), in only one (the 10th Precinct)
was the majority of the population white.- 'i-
4. Significantly, the rate at which stops led to arrests during the
covered period also differed by race. Overall, only one out of nine
stops resulted in an arrest. This stop/arrest rate differed, however,
based on the race of the person stopped. '" During the covered pe-
riod, the NYPD "stopped" 9.5 blacks for every one "stop" which re-
sulted in the arrest of a black, 8.8 Hispanics for every one "stop" that
resulted in the arrest of an Hispanic, and 7.9 whites for every one
"stop" that resulted in the arrest of a white suspect. " These data are
a strong indicator of racial discrimination as they are not affected by
crime rates, police deployment, or other factors that might explain
the racial disparities in the gross data regarding stops.
5. To test the hypothesis that higher crime rates in minority
communities fully explain the higher rate at which minorities are
stopped, various regression analyses were conducted.' They demon-
strated that differing crime rates alone cannot fully explain the in-
creased rate of stops of minorities. For example, the Attorney Gen-
eral compared stop/arrest ratios for blacks to stop/arrest ratios for
whites, and the same ratios for Hispanics and whites after accounting
for the effect of differing crime rates. '7 During the covered period,
and after accounting for these factors, blacks were "stopped" 23%
more often than whites, across all crime categories.-  In addition, af-
ter accounting for the effect of differing crime rates, Hispanics were
"stopped" 39% more often than whites across crime categories.-
6. With respect to the issue of whether "reasonable suspicion" ex-
isted for the stops, the Attorney General found that citywide, 15.4%
of all "stops" forms contained insufficient factual statements to justify
a "stop."  Further, the Attorney General noted that, "roughly one-
quarter of all ['stop'] forms (23.5%) did not appear to provide suffi-
cient information to allow a reader (including a police supervisor
2n M
Id. at 100-01. For a discussion of "neighborhood" and crime, see Margaret Raymond,
Down on the Coner, Out in the Street: Considering the (Yiamcr of the Ntighlodiced in Eraluatmg Ra-
sonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. LJ. 99 (1999) (noting that the character of a neighborhood is
often taken into consideration when establishing a reasonable suspicion that would justify a
TT stop).
REPORT OF ATTOR\T'E GENERAL OF NEIWYORK. supra note 46. at 111.
Id
Id. at 119-24, 130.
27 Id. at 123.
IdM id-
20Id. at 160-62.
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checking a junior officer's work) to determine whether the facts ar-
ticulated amount to 'reasonable suspicion. ' 291
The Attorney General's Report provides much reason for con-
cern. The racial disparities are simply too large to ignore and thou-
sands of persons are being stopped and frisked without any legal jus-
tification. 2  There are sound reasons for courts and police
departments to take these findings seriously. As the Supreme Court
has stressed, the "touchstone" of Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence is
the "reasonableness" of the governmental conduct. 2  Surely, if it is
clear that the factors which the courts have endorsed as providing
grounds for a "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity or for sus-
pecting that an individual is "dangerous," are empirically without
foundation, the doctrinal calculus should be subject to modification.
The New York Attorney General's Report presents a significant
challenge to the prevailing orthodoxy. First, by quantifying the arrest
rates for persons stopped pursuant to investigative detentions and
stop and frisk practices, we have a measure of the "success" rate for
these police practices. Since reasonable suspicion is required to
make these stops, there is now a statistical baseline from which we can
judge whether the factors relied upon by the police sufficiently dem-
onstrate this level of cause. Probable cause requires evidence that
would lead a person of "reasonable prudence [to believe] that con-
traband or evidence of a crime will be found,"294 or to believe that
there is a "fair probability" that the suspect has committed or is en-
gaged in criminal activity.2 Reasonable suspicion requires an objec-
tive and articulable belief that criminal activity is afoot, and a frisk re-
quires a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous.296
29 Id. at 162.
2 Notwithstanding the substantial evidence of arbitrary police investigatory stops and
searches, there is no indication of a change in official policy or practice. David Barstow, View
From New York Streets: No Retreat by Police, N.Y. TImEs,June 25, 2000, § 1, at 1.
293 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). See also, Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675
(2000) (reiterating Terrys holding that a police officer may stop a suspect upon a reasonable
belief that criminal activity is afoot without violating the Fourth Amendment); Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (holding that alcohol and drug tests established
by the Federal Railroad Administration were reasonable and thus did not violate the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (upholding stop of suspect by police
officer based on reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot). There has been a long-
standing debate between a "probable cause/warrant preference" and a "reasonableness" inter-
pretation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 144, at 801 (suggesting that the
core of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not probable cause); Anthony G. Amster-
dam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974) (discussing in detail the
development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Scott E. Sunby, "Everyman"s Fourth
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUMt. L. REv. 1751
(1994) (criticizing the greater reliance on the reasonableness doctrine in Fourth Amendment
juisprudence).
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).
295 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (defining probable cause required to secure a
search warrant).
296 E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18
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The Court has not quantified these standards-other than to state
that reasonable suspicion is "considerably less" than preponderance
of the evidence2q-but one would expect that where experienced po-
lice officers are engaging in practices that require a reasonable and
articulable belief concerning possible criminal conduct, such conduct
will be uncovered in more than a small percentage of the cases. If
not, either the police are not being truthful in their assertions (a
phenomenon that would not surprise those who have studied the
criminal justice system),-"s or the standards for stops and frisks are not
sufficiently demanding. There can be no precise delineation of a sta-
tistical standard for various police interventions (ranging from full
scale searches and arrests to stops and frisks of persons engaged in
"suspicious" conduct), but categorical estimates are possible. Thus,
while the answer to this question will reflect a normative judgment,
some attempts to quantify have been made. Professor Slobogin, for
example, suggests that stops and frisks should result in a 20% to 30%
rate of determination of criminal conduct.7
In New York, only one in nine recorded stops resulted in an arrest"'=
and there is good reason to believe that thousands of additional stops
that disclosed no criminal conduct were not recorded. ' Moreover,
some of the arrests were for conduct that occurred during the stop
(1981); Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000).
United States v. Sokolow 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). The Court has insisted on information that
distinguishes w.rongdoers from the universe of innocent persons. Reid v. Georgia. 448 U.S. 438,
441 (1980).
For a discussion of police perjury, particularly in the context of suppression hearings, see
H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 115-16 (1988) (noting die temptations for police to
commit pejury); Morgan Cloud, TheDir' Little Sccrrt, 43 EMORt" LJ. 1311. 1311 (1994) ("Police
perjury is the dirty little secret of our criminal justice system."); Donald A. Dripps, Pouee, Plus
Pejury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 693 (1996) ([C]riminal procedure
scholars agree that police perjury is not exotic."); Maclin, Race, supra note 25, at 379-86 (arguing
that police perjury is a legitimate concern in pretextual traffic stops based on race); Christo-
pher Slobogin, Testil)ing. Police Perjury and illaat to do About it, 67 COLo. L RE%. 1037 (1996)
(discussing police perjury and ways to reduce it); Scott Turow, Lying to Gt the Bad Guys, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, § 4 (Week in Review), at 13; Irving Younger. The Pequ. Routiae, TE
NATION, May 8, 1967, at 596 (discussing police perjuiy during probable cause hearings). The
.code of silence" may also place substantial obstacles in proving improper police conduct. F..,
GabrielJ. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Iial of Silence" as Etidence of Bias and .Motya to Lze: A
New Approach to Police Pejuy, 59 U. Prrr. L RE'. 233 (1998); Gilles. supra note 219Jerome H.
Skolnick, CodBlue; THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, March 27, 2000. at 49.
299 Christopher Slobogin, Let's No! Bury Terry: A Callfor Rdevtation of the PPrirounahty Pin-
cdple, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv,. 1053, 1082-84 (1998); see also, C.M.A. McCatliff. Burdens of Proof.
Degrees of Belief Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantrcs?, 35 VA,sD. L RE%. 1293, 1328-32
(1982) (survey of 164 federal judges disclosed a predominant range of 10rc-50% level of cer-
tainty for establishing "reasonable suspidon," uith an average of '29.59% . On the issues pre-
sented by probabilistic proof compare Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Huntan uformarwawn
Processing and Adjudication: Trialby Heuristics, 15 L & SOC*a. RE . 123 (1980-81) (arguing that
mathematics has a role in the trial process), and Laurence H. Tribe. Trial le" latheriatzes Pre'c-
sion andRitual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L REV. 1329 (1971) (discounting the use of mathe-
matical techniques in the trial process).
3W REPORT OFATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK. supra note 46. at 11I.
301 See id. at 66.
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and frisk.302 The statistics with respect to the Street Crimes Unit are
even more revealing. This Unit is composed of highly experienced
officers, a characteristic that the courts repeatedly state requires sub-
stantial weight in determining whether the officer's actions were rea-
sonable.03 Not only was the success rate of this "experienced" unit
poorer than the Department as a whole, but in the very category of
policing in which they place their greatest emphasis-the removal of
firearms from pedestrians-their record was the weakest."' In only
2.5 of every 100 stops in which the factual predicate was suspicion
that a suspect was carrying a weapon did the police find a firearm.30
There are two principle explanations for these troubling statistics.
First, as discussed above, "reasonable suspicion" allows the police to
effectuate stops and frisks on a relatively low quantum of evidence
that permits broad "commonsense judgments" concerning human
behavior.30 6 Historically the Court has permitted stops in situations in
which the conduct observed is likely to be innocent, or the source of
the information on which the stop is based is highly questionable."" '
Thus, if the judgment is made that there are too many stops of inno-
cent persons, a somewhat different calibration of the standards for
these stops may be necessary.
Second, the police may be making stops without the requisite rea-
sonable suspicion, by reason of misapplication of legal standards or
the deliberate decision to ignore limitations on their powers. It is dif-
ficult to avoid the conclusion that in departments that promote ag-
gressive policing tactics without institutional safeguards sufficient to
protect against abuses, a large number of the stops of innocent per-
sons are the product of random, arbitrary stops, particularly of mi-
norities. Remedying this problematic situation is far more difficult.
It will require first and foremost a substantial change in policy and
Id. at 80-82.
303 It is almost a mantra of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the "experience" of the
officer is a significant factor. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (noting
that "a reviewing court should take care ... to give due weight to inferences drawn from...
local law enforcement officers," when determining whether a stop based on probable cause is
reasonable); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("[A] trained officer draws infer-
ences and makes deductions-inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained
person."); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (1979) (noting that the situation in tile case
should be, "distinguished from the observations of a trained, experienced police officer who is
able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to
the untrained observer."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1968) ("It would have been poor
police work indeed for an officer of 30 years' experience ... to have failed to investigate...
further.").
REPORT OFATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK, supra note 46, at 117-18.
305 Id. at 117 n.23.
See Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000).
307 See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000) (flight in itself can be a major factor for
stop); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 3 (1989) (upholding stop of airplane passenger
based on drug courier profile factors); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 352 (1990) (upholding a1
stop based on information detailing normal daily activity from anonymous source).
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practice in police departments that have tolerated random and suspi-
cionless searches and strict internal monitoring, and supervision and
discipline of officers and supervisors who engage or acquiesce in this
type of policing.m It will also require the courts to be far more skep-
tical of police testimony in both criminal and civil actions. And it will
require a change in the application of legal doctrine, including sub-
stantive constitutional standards and remedial measures."
While the issues of race bias and cause for stops and frisks are of-
ten addressed as distinct constitutional matters, not infrequently po-
lice investigative detentions present concurrent consideration of both
factors. For example, in Brown v. City of Oneonta,"" a police manhunt
followed the report of an assault of an elderly woman in the town of
Oneonta, New York.'" She informed the police that her attacker was
a young black man and that he had cut himself on his hand during
the incident 312 Fewer than 300 blacks lived in this town, and at a
nearby State University, approximately 2% of the students were
black.. The police made a "sweep" of the ton, stopping and ques-
tioning over 200 black men and inspecting their hands for cuts."'
In a civil rights suit, the court ruled that a selection of all black
men for investigation in a case in which they had a racial description
and a relatively small number of possible suspects, even though there
was no description of anything beyond race and age ("young" black
man), did not constitute intentional race discrimination." ' Accord-
ing to the court, the police had a racial description, and it was not in-
tentional race discrimination to investigate all persons in that racial
316group.
Having isolated and rejected race as a constitutional problem, the
court proceeded to analyze the Fourth Amendment claims to deter-
mine whether any of the plaintiffs were "seized" by the police in their
respective encounters.1 7 The Supreme Court has ruled that a seizure
occurs (thus mandating application of Fourth Amendment "cause"
standards) only where the "force or show of authority" is sufficient to
lead a reasonable person to believe that she is not free to leave'"4
For a more detailed analysis of effective remedial measures. uet wfa Part IV.
09i
310 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000).
31 Id. at 334.
312 Id
313 Id-
314 Id
315 lod at 337-38.
316 Id
317 Id. at 340.
318 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968); United States v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544. 554
(1980) (a person is "seized" within meaning of Fourth Amendment only when by mcans of
physical force or show of authority his freedom of movement is restrained and in view of all of
the circumstances a reasonable person would have believed that he %as not free to leae). In
Horida v. Bostick 501 U.S. 429 (1991), the Court found no coercive conduct sufficient to estab-
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The circuit court recognized that the description of a young, black
man was too vague tojustify a stop, 19 and in assessing whether young,
black men approached by the Oneonta police were subject to a "sei-
zure," the court found such action where a police officer pointed a
spotlight at the plaintiff, said, "[w]hat, are you stupid? Come here. I
want to talk to you," 320 and instructed him to show his hands.
321
A second plaintiff was stopped and encircled by three police offi-
cers on the street, questioned as to whether he was a student and re-
quested to produce his identification.3 2  As he started to leave an offi-
cer asked him to come back and to see his hands.2 3 Again the court
324found a seizure. One can only speculate what would have hap-
pened to these individuals if they had refused the police command to
stop and show their hands. 5
Brown's equal protection analysis finesses the difficult issues. The
fact that a description of a suspect includes a racial characteristic
should be the start and not the end of the analysis. Race is surely an
appropriate consideration in such an investigation, but where it be-
comes the "predominant" factor, strict scrutiny applies. 6 Under this
approach, a court should consider what other descriptive characteris-
tics are known, the size of the potential community of "suspects," and
the intrusiveness of the police investigation. Thus, it may be that a
court should distinguish between benign forms of investigation (for
example, a simple written inquiry to speak with the police) and a
physical confrontation or forcible stop. Regardless of where the line
should be drawn, the racial discrimination issue cannot be decided
on the simplistic notion that any racial description permits a sweep-
ing, intrusive inquiry. The disquiet that Brown produces results from
of the artificial doctrinal lines that the Supreme Court has drawn
around the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
lish a seizure of an interstate bus passenger who, at a scheduled stop, was surrounded in the bus
by armed narcotics officers, and "consented" to a search of her luggage. The Court ruled that a
"reasonable person" could have felt free, "to decline the officers' requests or otherwise termi-
nate the encounter." Id. at 436.
319 Brown, 221 F.3d at 340.
320 Id. at 340.
321 Id.
323 Id.
323 Id
324 Id.
323 One commentator, incredulous that a federal court could uphold the stop of every black
man in this town on the basis of the information in this case, described the affair as "Breathing
While Black." Bob Herbert, Breathing While Black, N.Y. TihtEs, Nov. 4, 1999, at A29. The court
in Brown v. City of Oneonta did state that it recognized the "sense of frustration that was doubt-
lessly felt by those questioned," and cautioned that police should "always be cognizant of the
impressions they leave on a community," but thought these concerns had nothing to do with
equal protection analysis. 195 F.3d at 120.
326 See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996) (determining that strict scrutiny applies when
race is the "predominant" consideration in drawing congressional district lines); City of Rich-
mond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny in analyzing affirmi-
ive action programs that awarded city construction projects).
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Of course, beyond the substantive doctrinal issues, consideration
must also be given to the remedial measures that may be available to
persons subjected to unconstitutional police stop and frisk practices.
Here, too, as I now explain, a web of doctrinal, procedural and prac-
tical barriers make vindication of protected rights far from a cer-
tainty.
IV. THE REMEDIAL FRAMEWORK
The principle that "[t] he very essence of civil liberty certainly con-
sists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury,"2 has never been a truism in
our constitutional framework, and both legislative and judicially im-
posed limitations on remedial mechanisms can preclude the relief
necessary to vindicate the substantive legal claim.- In this section, I
explore potential remedies for racial profiling and random stops and
frisks (suppression of evidence, civil damage actions, and equitable
relief) to determine their availability and efficacy in these cases.
A. Suppression of Evidence
The exclusionary rule will provide a remedy for some victims of il-
legal stops, but it is not well suited to provide systemic relief from ra-
cial profiling and random stop and frisk practices. First, as a doc-
trinal matter, if probable cause othenise exists, racially
discriminatory stops are not subject to the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule, and the Supreme Court has yet to recognize a suppres-
sion remedy under the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, since most
persons who are subjected to these practices are not arrested, the
matter is never subject to criminal adjudication.
Third, where the police fail to comply ith the substantive stan-
dards of the Fourth Amendment, limitations on the application of
the exclusionary rule may still permit use of the evidence. Thus, the
M7 Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
As Professor Burbank has stated, f[s]ubstantive rights... are worth no more than the
procedural mechanisms available for their realization and protection." Stephen B. Burbank.
The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, Histoyy, and Limitations on FederalJudwni Preir--A Case Study.
75 NOTRE DAME L RE%. 1291, 1293 (2000).
"_ This article does not address potential state causes of action or remedies for racial profil-
ing and arbitrary stop and frisk practices. As has been well documented, howvcer, state courts,
interpreting state constitutions, have often provided greater protections from arrest and search
practices than are required by the federal Constitution. See, e.g.. David A. Hams, Addressing Ra-
cial Profdling in the States, 3 U. P,.J. CONST. L 368 (2001).
SM Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that police stops for traffic iola-
dons based upon probable cause do not iolate the Fourth Amendment. men if the stops were
pretextual). Some state courts have rejected Mimi or otherwise held that racial bias in a stop
or arrest is grounds for exclusion of evidence under search and seizure principles. Eg., States.
Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
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"standing" irement,331 the "good faith exception, " "' and narrow
conceptions of an individual's expectation of privacy,333 have signifi-
cantly limited the potential remedial impact of the exclusionary rule.
Fourth, discovery in criminal cases is far more restricted than in
civil litigation 34 and therefore the evidence necessary to demonstrate
that racial profiling is a practice or policy (the data that can be col-
lected from records of other stops by the police department) will not
be available to individual defendants. Moreover, even if the criminal
discovery rules mandated disclosure of the records in other stops and
searches, most defendants will not have the resources, time, or exper-
tise to-retrieve and analyze the documents, or to make the requisite
statistical showing in support of a constitutionally-based suppression
of evidence claim.
Fifth, many suppression motions turn on credibility, and where
such a determination against a police officer requires the suppression
of critical evidence, courts frequently decide these cases in favor of
the prosecution notwithstanding the not-infrequent occasions of po-
lice perjury.335 The evidence that might persuade a court that an offi-
cer's version of the events is questionable or fabricated is normally
not within the scope of the criminal discovery rules or within the in-
vestigative reach of a defense lawyer. For example, in litigation con-
cerning car stops on 1-95 in the Philadelphia area, civil discovery
demonstrated that hundreds of cars were stopped without adequate
cause;, the police stopped cars at will and listed patently false reasons
for the stop.3 6 In many instances the police gave no adequate reason
for a stop (where no contraband was recovered) or falsely asserted
331 See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (standing to contest the legality of a search
restricted to persons who had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the items or premises
searched); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (possessory interest in items seized not
enough to confer standing; defendant must have legitimate expectation of privacy with respect
to someone else's purse and its contents).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-24 (1984) (evidence of search not ex-
cluded where reasonable officer would believe search warrant stated probable cause, even
though it did not).
3 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in trash); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no legitimate expectation of privacy in
phone number dialed); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (open fields beyond the
curtilage are not protected by the Fourth Amendment).
&" United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (limiting discovery on claim of selective
prosecution based on race to instances where there is credible evidence that similarly situated
defendants of other races had been treated differently); Andrew E. Taslitz, Slaves no More!: The
Implications of the Informed Citizen Ideal for Discovery Before Fourth Amendment Suppression Hearings,
15 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 709 (1999) ("Pre-trial discovery in criminal cases is extraordinarily lim-
ited.").
3" See supra note 298.
33 SeeWilson v. Tinicum Township, No. Civ. A. 92-6617, 1993 WL 280205, at *2 (E.D. Pa.July
20, 1993) (noting police excuse used to establish a "legitimate" stop); Plaintiffs' Memorandum
of Law in Support of Their Motion for Class Certification at 7-9, Wilson v. Tinicum Township,
No. Civ. A. 92-6617, 1993 WL 280205 (E.D. Pa.July 20, 1993) (No. 92-6617) (detailing incidents
of illegal stops of cars and "routine" searches for drugs).
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that a rear tail light was defective, a rear view mirror was obstructed
by a hanging object, or that the driver was proceeding "recklessly." 7
Affidavits from persons who were stopped in these circumstances re-butted the asserted justifications for the stops and strongly suggestedthat the police were engaged in a widespread practice of racial profil-
ing and random car stops without even the minimal basis for a stoprequired by Whren.3" Further, police reports concerning alleged con-sent to search were seriously disputed by a large number of "inno-cent" subjects (and other witnesses) of these stops."- Had this infor-mation been available to defendants in criminal cases arising fromthe drug interdiction program, more ersuasive arguments could
have been made on the credibility issues.
A notable exception to the general ineffectiveness of the exclu-sionary rule as an antidote for pattern and practice violations is thelitigation of suppression issues in State v. Soto,5" the case that becamethe pening wedge in the New Jersey Turnpike racial profiling scan-
dal. Invoking New Jersey's comparatively liberal discovery proce-dures in cases alleging selective prosecution,m the defendants in aconsolidated motion to suppress challenging stop and search prac-tices on the southern end of the Turnpike presented evidence thatAfrican-Americans were being stopped at rates that far exceeded
their use of the Turnpike and they were authorized by the trial courtto discover a broad range of police documents relating to all stopsand searches by state police for the relevant time period." These
documents, statistical studies of the data, and internal operatingdocuments of the state police were sufficient to prove an extraordi-nary pattern of racial profiling and, under state law principles, the
trial court suppressed the evidence in the cases. 34
Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 3-6. Tinicurn Township (No. 92-6617).S3s Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Memorandum, Tinicum Township (No. 92-6617).
In d
so Review of the files in which contraband .as found disclosed that tie courts rejected sup-pression motions in great majority of the cases. Occasionally, however, a trial judge found thepolice testimony simply too incredible. In one case, the court found a stop of a car vuith threeblack males made on the allegation that a small ornament from a rear view mirror "materiallyobstructed" the driver's view through the windshield to be insufficient to establish cause for thestop. Commonwealth v. Miller, No. 4627-91 (Pa. CL Com. P1. of Del. County Crim. Div. Sept. 9,
1992).
M1 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. CL Law Div. 1996).342 See William H. Buckman & John Lamberth, Callenging Racial Profiles: Atadng fet Craw
on the Interstate CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 14.
3s See State v. Kennedy, 588 A.2d 834 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1991) (statistical survey %%ssufficient to raise colorable claim of selective enforcement of traffic laws against minorities andto ermit discovery of internal state police records).
Soto, 734 A2d at 352.
343 Id. at 352-58, 361. The state filed a notice of appeal but subsequenty uithdrew its appealat the time that the Attorney General of New Jersey issued the "Interim Report' on racial profil-ing on the Turnpike. See also Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 711 N.E.2d 108 (Mass. 1999) (reject-ing the doctrine of Mar'land v. I1!son, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), stating that the doctrine creates apolice power providing, "a dear invitation to discriminatory enforcement'). Justice Ireland
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As the evidence concerning racial profiling continues to develop,
some courts may be more receptive to pattern- and practice-type dis-
covery and proof in the criminal suppression hearing. However, it is
unlikely that the exclusionary rule will engender systemic change in
police practices in these areas.
B. Civil Damage Actions
The federal civil rights act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides for damages
for harm caused by unconstitutional stops and searches conducted by
state or local officials. 46 Claims against federal defendants (usually in
the context of border, customs and airport searches) can be main-
tained directly under the Constitution as a Bivens action,"" or under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.34 The case law and commentary on Sec-
tion 1983 and Bivens actions is extensive and I will comment briefly
only on the potential uses and limitations of damage actions as a
means of providing redress to persons unlawfully stopped or
searched, and as a means of effectuating systematic reforms.
Damage awards have some potential for triggering institutional re-
forms. Large verdicts in cases involving unconstitutional practices or
customs may deter future misconduct. Proof of racial bias has led to
significant damages in the police misconduct context.
49 Where un-
noted the widespread public concern with racial profiling and stated that 
the broad discretion
provided by Wilson would contribute to this problem. Id. at 669-700 (Ireland,J., 
concurring).
346 See generally, MICHAEL AVERY, KAREN BLUM & DAVID RUDOVSKY, POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW
& LITIGATION (3d ed. 1999); SHELDON NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION
(4th ed. 1999).
M7 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that plaintiffs can
sue federal defendants in federal court for Fourth Amendment violations). 
See also, Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (holding that a remedy was available directly under the 
Constitution
even though allegations could also support a suit under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act); Chappell
v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (unique disciplinary structure of military 
establishment and
Congress' activity in field constitute "special factors" which dictate that it would 
be inappropri-
ate to provide enlisted military personnel a Biveas-type remedy against their superior 
officers).
348 Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Sta. 842 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
39 E.g., Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming award of $245,000 for ra-
cially-motivated arrest and use of excessive force); Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244 
(9th Cir.
1993) (allowing $90,000 compensatory damages for unlawful arrest and 
excessive force, wlile
award of $450,000 in punitive damages remanded for further consideration 
by the district
court); Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1987) (where racially motivated conduct 
had a "pro-
found and lasting effect" on plaintiff, court sustains award of $375,000 plus attorneys' 
fees). In
the highway racial profiling cases, there have been significant settlements (often 
joined with
affirmative relief by way of consent decree) that have been effective in changing 
practices. See,
e.g., Robert Jackson, Eagle County Must Pay for Stopping Motorists, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
NEWS, Nov.
10, 1995, at A4 (reporting $800,000 settlement of racial profiling claim based 
on litigation,
Whitfield v. Board of County Commn'rs, 837 F. Supp. 338 (D. Colo. 1993)); Settlement Agreement,
Wilson v. Tinicum Township, No. 92-6617 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 1995). By contrast, 
an initial set-
tlement in the 1-95 litigation in Maryland in Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, CA. 
No. 93-468 (D.
Md. 1996), failed to end racial profiling and new litigation has been initiated. See 
Maryland
State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Maryland Dep't of State Police, 72 F. Stipp. 
2d 560 (D.
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constitutional practices affect large numbers of persons, as is the case
with racial profiling and random stops and searches, the potential
damages exposure is commensurately substantial, and governmental
agencies may seek to avoid large judgments by a change in practices
and policies. Thus, while most commentators have correctly asserted
that civil damage actions are not an effective means of achieving sys-
temic or institutional change,s in selected areas, the conventional
wisdom may not control.
Other limitations of the damages remedy are well recognized.
First, not every violation of a Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment right
wil establish an entitlement to a damages remedy. The doctrine of
qualified immunity provides a broad scope of protection from indi-
vidual liabilit from damages where the right asserted was not "clearly
established," or where a reasonably well-trained officer would not
have known that his conduct would violate the Constitution! "  In
Hunter v. Byant,s5 the Court ruled that immunity would protect an
officer if it was reasonable to believe that probable cause existed,
even if it did not.' ChiefJudge Newman has criticized this concep-
tual formulation:
It is not readily apparent how a police officer could have an objectively
reasonable belief that conduct was lawful when the unlawfulness of that
conduct rests on a determination that an objectively reasonable police of-
fice would not have acted. And the situation is especially perplexing in a
case like the pending one where, for purposes of removing the first issue
from the jury, it has been determined, correctly in our view, that no rea-
sonable juror could fail to find that the officer's conduct was unlawful.
Nevertheless, we have been authoritatively instructed that the objec-
tive reasonableness component of the inquiry as to law~fulness is not the
same as the objective reasonableness component of the inquiry as to
qualified immunity.35
Md. 1999).
Eg., Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter ofJudicial evim,: A Costautional CeLSU.S of
the 1990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 427,499-503 (1997).
351 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
m502 U.S. 224 (1991) (per curiam).
Id. at 227-28.
Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 648 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Kames v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485.
491n.3 (3d Cir. 1995) ("There is no conflict in saying a police officer who acted unreasonably
nevertheless reasonably (but mistakenly) believed his conduct was reasonable.") By contrast.
where a claim is based on intentional race discrimination, qualified immunity should not be a
bar to recovery, since the prohibition against intentionally biased conduct has been so widely
and emphatically established. Eg., Wade v. Hegner, 804 F.2d 67 (7th Cir. 1986); Hobson v.
Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984). On the Court's qualified immunity jurisprudence, see,
Alan K Chen, The Ultimate Standard- Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional Balttiang
Tests, 81 IoWA L REv. 261 (1995); Kit Kinports, Habeas Corpus, Qualified hlnmuntv, and Costal
Balls: Predicting the Course ofConstitutiona Lau 33 ARIZ. L R.Ev. 115 (1991); David Rudovsl, The
Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court Judicial Actitsm and the Restnaton of Constitutzonal
Rigts, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 23 (1989).
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Eleventh Amendment immunity and the statutory limitations on
municipal liability may preclude recovery from the only sources that
can actually satisfy a judgment. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits
suit against a state or state entity (e.g., the Division of State Police)
for damages, and under the Court's section 1983 jurisprudence, a
municipal employer is liable only if the constitutional violation was
caused by a municipal law, policy, practice, or custom.
35 7
As a practical matter, very few violations of the rights of motorists
or pedestrians are likely to be filed as civil rights actions. Where con-
traband is discovered and a criminal prosecution initiated, any civil
case must normally await the outcome of the criminal process, and
may be precluded by findings and judgments made in the criminal
litigation.3 8 Even if there is no legal preclusive effect, the fact of the
criminal conviction may undermine any civil suit. Moreover, even
where the criminal case is disposed of favorably to the defendant, if
the contraband can still be fairly attributed to him, juries are unlikely
to provide compensation, even for clear constitutional violations.
In cases in which no contraband is found, and a strong legal claim
for damages can be stated, the damages may be too modest to justify
full-scale litigation. Absent particularly harsh or malicious conduct,
the damages that flow from a relatively short stop and incidental frisk
or search, may appear to be nominal to some juries.35 9 As a result,
such cases are not likely to attract competent counsel30 Moreover,
many civil rights plaintiffs are burdened by racial and class character-
istics that may prejudice juries against them. Jurors tend to dismiss
their allegations, often awarding them less than a full measure of
"% Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). But see Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (holding
that state officials, sued in their individual capacity, are not immune under the Eleventh
Amendment).
37 Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown 520 U.S. 397 (1997); City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378 (1989); Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Section 1983 has
also been interpreted to bar civil rights actions by persons convicted of crimes whose convic-
tions have not been reversed or vacated, if success of the civil rights claims, "would necessarily
imply the invalidity of the [plaintiff's] conviction." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487
(1994). See also, Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998) (noting that section 1983 actions are
not available where plaintiff's claim would imply the invalidity of his parole revocation). This
doctrine may bar suits by persons who have been convicted based on events that transpired dur-
ing the car or pedestrian stop, where the civil damage claim is based on alleged constitutional
violations that occurred during the same incident. E.g., Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d
117 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that plaintiffs complaint would be barred if it would suggest that
plaintiffs criminal conviction was invalid); Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868 (5th Cir. 1996) (af-
firming dismissal of section 1983 complaint based on false arrest and excessive force during an
arrest where plaintiff had been convicted of possession of a firearm and battery of an officer
based on the same event).
See, e.g., Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (holding that plaintiff cannot bring a section 1983 claim
that would challenge the plaintiffs underlying conviction).
M9 See David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence be Contained?, 27 HxRV. C.R.-C.L. REV.
465, 490-91 (1992).
3W Id.
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compensation36'
The prospects change radically, however, if claims can be joined,
and particularly if a class action can be maintained. By the very na-
ture of drug interdiction and related car and pedestrian stop opera-
tions, thousands of persons may be subjected to unlawful practices.
The case for liability becomes exponentially stronger with the sup-
portive allegations and testimony of hundreds or thousands of "inno-
cent" victims of governmental overreaching, and the damage claims
become substantial enough to sustain federal litigation. Fear of dam-
ages could cause governmental units to reconsider their practices and
policies, but are generally insufficient, standing alone, to effectuate
institutional change.32
C. Injunctive Relief
Federal injunctive relief against state or local officers upon a
showing of a violation of federal constitutional or statutory rights is
potentially the most effective and far-reaching remedial mechanism
for preventing future violations of rights. The injunctive action is not
encumbered by personal immunities and the Eleventh Amendment
bar is avoided under the Ex Parte Young doctrine." However, the
federal court's equitable powers are circumscribed by federalism,
comity, and standing doctrines.s To establish a claim for equitable
relief, the plaintiff must meet the ordinary requirements for an in-
junction: that legal remedies are inadequate and that plaintiff is in
danger of sustaining substantial and immediate injury if the injunc-
tion is not granted.j
The requirement of a likelihood of future injury has been treated
by the Supreme Court as a separate jurisdictional component: that
the plaintiff must show a "credible threat" and not mere "conjectural"
future injury.-6 In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons"7 the plaintiff was
stopped by Los Angeles police officers for a traffic violation. After
Lyons got out of his car, the officers drew their guns, ordered him to
place his hands on top of his head and, without provocation, placed
36Id. (citation omitted).
M It seems dear that many jurisdictions consider pa)ments to -ictims of misconduct part of
the "cost of policing." See Bandes, supra note 67, at 1337-38 (noting that Ne" York City paid
over $31 million dollars in settlements and judgments in 1998, but failed to take action against
officers responsible for the misconduct).
ExParteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21. 30-31 (1991).
MA Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); City of Los Angeles v. L)vns. 461 U.S. 95 (1983);
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
= Lyons, 461 U.S. at 103; Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802,814 (1974).
56 Kolender v. Lmson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 n.3 (1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494-
96 (1974).
461 U.S. 95 (1983).
3W Lyons, 461 U.S. at 97.
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him in a chokehold causing damage to his larynx.369 The Supreme
Court ruled that Lyons had not proved a sufficient likelihood that he
would again be subject to a police chokehold to make out a case or
controversy on his request for an injunction. °
The Court stated:
In order to establish an actual controversy in this case, Lyons would have
had not only to allege that he would have another encounter with the po-
lice but also to make the incredible assertion either (1) that all police of-
ficers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they happen to
have an encounter, whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing a citation,
or for questioning, or (2) that the City ordered or authorized police offi-
37'cers to act in such manner.
While the first condition appears draconian, the alternative
ground for standing, that the conduct sought to be enjoined is offi-
cially authorized, may be more easily established in racial profiling
cases, where a pattern and practice of illegal stops of large numbers
of persons is proven. 2 Where the alleged unconstitutional conduct
is the product of official policy or practice, there is a far greater like-
lihood that the conduct will be repeated and that a plaintiff who en-
gages in activities that will bring him into the purview of those prac-
tices will suffer future injury. The existence of a policy that will
directly affect the plaintiff or members of plaintiff class may be suffi-
cient to establish standing.
373
69 Id. at 114-15 (Marshall,J., dissenting)
370 Id. at 110.
371 Id. at 105-06.
3 See, Lyons, 461 U.S. at 113-37 (1983) (Marshall,J., dissenting); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S.
802, 815 (1974) (holding that where there is a pattern of police misconduct in suppressing or-
ganized labor activities, injunctive relief is appropriate); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability,
Remedies and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984)
(noting that under the standing test set out in Lyons, a plaintiff must show present and continu-
in injuries).
-7, See, e.g, Deshawn E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that police interrogation
practices subject to equitable relief, but court dismisses claim based on failure of proof); Easy-
riders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that the fourteen
named plaintiffs have standing to obtain statewide injunctive relief against the state police
where illegal citation practices were the result of official practice and policy); Thomas v. County
of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that plaintiffs had standing where "nu-
merous instances of police misconduct have occurred in a small six by seven block area, [andi]
some minority residents of the area have been mistreated by deputies more than once"); Rodri-
guez v. California Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1135-36 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that
NAACP and LULAC have standing in racial profiling suit). In Maryland State Conference of
NAACP Branches v. Maryland Departrment of State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d 560, 565 (D. Md. 1999), the
Court stated:
Here, the plaintiffs' likelihood of injury depends only on their status as a member of a
minority group and their need to travel on 1-95. An "illegal" action on their part associ-
ated with the future stop need be no more than a minor, perhaps unintentional, traffic
infraction; indeed, according to their allegations, they may be stopped even if no traffic
violation has been committed. The plaintiffs also have reason to expect they will con-
tinue to travel on 1-95. This combination of alleged past injury, an earlier pattern and prac-
ticefinding, and the plaintiffs' likely future travel is sufficient to confer standing. (empha-
sis added).
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The Supreme Court distinguished Lyons in Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services,"' in granting Article III standing to
plaintiffs in an environmental lawsuit challenging the pollution of a
river.375 The plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered "injury in fact" as
they were deterred from using the river for recreational purposes.
The Court ruled that there w -as "nothing 'improbable' about the
proposition that a company's continuous and pervasive discharge of
pollutants into a river would cause nearby residents to curtail their
recreational use of that waterny and would subject them to other
economic and aesthetic harms."" The Court ruled that Lyons did not
bar the action as the unlawful conduct was occurring at the time of
the filing of the complaint, "' a holding that confirms the significant
difference between allegations of occasional unlawful conduct and
practice and policy cases. Of course, a polluted river can affect eve-
ryone using that water source while racial profiling on highways ran-
domly affects thousands out of a much larger class of drivers. Thus,
the question becomes whether once a policy of racial profiling is es-
tablished, it would be "improbable" for minorities to avoid certain
highways or for certain members of the minority group to be stopped
on those roads.5s 9
Beyond the "official policy" argument, there are several grounds
for distinguishing Lyons. First, the Court stressed that the past en-
counter would only repeat itself if Lyons would again violate the law,
thus prompting a police stop, and the highly unusual improper ap-
plication of a chokeholdss But as the courts have recognized, where
for reasons beyond the control of the plaintiff, she is unable to avoid
repeating the conduct that led to the original injury, there is a
greater likelihood of future injury justifying injunctive relief.I In ra-
cial profiling cases where the claim is made that the stop is based on
an immutable characteristic and that the plaintiff has not engaged in
unlawful activity, this distinction may be sufficient to provide stand-
7 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000).
31 Id. at 705-06.
376 Id at 704-06.
3-17. at 706; see also Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Rec)cling Corp.. 204 F.3d 149,
156-61 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (folloing Laidlaw in determining that plaintiff had standing
where plaintiffs use ofa aterway %as reduced by defendant's actions).
8 Laid/aw, 120 S. Ct. at 706.
In City of Erie v. Pap's, A.M, 120 S. C. 1382 (2000), the Court, citing Laidlau' found an
appeal not moot even in the face of a party's declaration that it would not seek to engage in the
challenged conduct in the future. The mere possibility of renewed conduct %sm deemed sufli-
cient to permit adjudication. I. at 1390.
City of Los Angles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1983).
S81 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320 (1988) (finding that emotionally handicapped indiv idual
cannot conform his conduct to socially acceptable norms; therefore. it is reasonable to expect
that he will again engage in classroom misconduct); see also, Church v. City of Huntmille, 30
F.3d 1332, 1337-78 (11th Cir. 1994) (homeless persons had standing to seek injunction prevent-
ing city from implementing policy of isolating and/or remoing homeless persons).
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ing.8
Moreover, the conduct adversely affects a class of persons by rea-
son of the invidious characteristic of race. In Lyons, the Court may
have been reluctant to make a definitive ruling on chokeholds (which
are permissible in some circumstances) without the presence of a
party who had a clear stake in the outcome. Racial bias in policing
can never be justified and permitting a challenge to such practices by
persons who might not otherwise have standing to challenge police
policies would be consistent with the Court's willingness to grant
broad standing to challenge racially discriminatory practices."
Second, Lyons was subjected to the chokehold on only one occa-
sion and the record in the case demonstrated that this type of force,
while serious and at times deadly, *84 was infrequently employed by the
Department.- By contrast, racial profiling plaintiffs, either individu-
ally or as members of a class, may have been subjected to numerous
stops. Thus, in cases where the plaintiffs alleged repeated stops and a
pattern of unconstitutional stops and searches of others, the lower
courts have found standing to invoke the court's equitable powers."
Where a class action is certified, standing should be determined by
aggregating all of the factual claims of the class members."7 Under
current doctrine, however, a court may still view the likelihood of fu-
ture injury as to any particular person to be remote (in profiling
situations, given the large number of drivers even a policy of stopping
racial minorities may not lead to repeated stops of a particular per-
son), and for that reason rule that a practice that affects thousands of
persons is insulated from judicial equitable review because most indi-
viduals are not likely to be the victim on more than one occasion.
3 E.g., Anderson v. Comejo, No. 97 C 7556, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 519 (N.D. III. Jan. 11,
1999); National Cong. for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 191 F.R.D. 52 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
383 See, Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1996) (noting that plaintiff who resides inside a
district that was created through "a gerrymandered districting scheme" had standing); Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that white defendant had standing to object to exclusion of
black prospective jurors from his trial); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205
(1972) (finding that tenants who sued owner for racial discrimination under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 had standing through the Court's "generous construction" of the Act).
SeeLyons, 461 U.S. at 113-15 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
5 d. at 110.
See id. at 111-13 (noting that injunctive relief is available upon a showing that there is "a
sufficient likelihood that [plaintiff] will again be wronged in a similar way"). By contrast, in
Hodgers-Durgin v. DeLa Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) the court nled that
two individuals who had each been stopped once over a several-year period and who regularly
drove in the area in which they claimed illegal "border" stops were being made, lacked standing
to challenge the actions of the Border Patrol.
37 See e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397-403 (1975) (upholding standing of class even
where individual who brought the suit no longer met the class requirements); Nicacio v. INS,
797 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding class action lawsuit brought by minorities against the
INS). However if the plaintiff lacks standing, the case may be dismissed prior to class certifica-
tion. Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1042.
E.g., Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1042; Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1053
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D. Federal Government Interuention
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
authorizes the United States, through the Attorney General, to bring
civil actions for declaratory or equitable relief against police depart-
ments engaged in a pattern or practice of deprivation of constitu-
tional or statutory rights.& The statute provides potentially broad
grounds for intervention and relief, but until recently practical politi-
cal realities muted the law's potential reach.' Since 1994, the DOJ
has taken legal action against five law enforcement agencies: it has
reached consent decrees with the City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylania,
the City of Steubenville, Ohio,s ' and the State of NewJersey (with re-
spect to the racial profiling on the New Jersey Turnpike).* It has
reached a Settlement Agreement with Montgomery County, Mary-
land (racial profiling on 1-95)s9S and has initiated litigation against the
Columbus, Ohio Police Department."
(N.D. IMl. 1998). Another potential bar to injunctive relief is the decision in R=o v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 380 (1976), where the Court, relying heavily on principles of federalism. reversed an
injunction requiring a police department to more effectively investigate and adjudicate civilian
complaints of abuse. The Court was not persuaded that the evidence %as sufficient to demon-
strate a pattern and practice of misconduct within the police deparunent and cautioned against
intrusive federal court intervention in local government operationm Id. However. in Monell n.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Court ruled that an evidentary sho%%ing
that a municipality's policy, practice, or custom caused the constitutional violation is sufficient
to warrant ajudgment against the municipality. See also, City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378
(1989) (municipal liability is established where city is deliberately indifferent in its training of
police and lack of training causes a constitutional violation). Under this standard, it would ap-
pear that the municipality would be liable for damages and would be subject to equitable relief
for a proven unconstitutional practice, policy, or custom.
As noted above, the barriers created by Lyons and Ri:o v. Goode have been overcome in
some cases, and consent decrees and settlement agreements have provided effective remedial
mechanisms. E.g; Settlement and Monitoring Agreement and Stipulations of te Parties.
NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, CA. No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (on file with author);Julia C.
Martinez, Settlement Reached in Tinicum Suit, PHIL. INQUIRER OCL 6, 1994, at BI; see. Wilson v.
Tinicum Township, No. Civ. A. 92-6617, 1993 WL 280205 (E.D. PaJuly 20, 1993) (granting mo-
tion for class certification based on racial profiling on higiway stops). As I discuss in the follow-
ing section, the United States has also entered into Consent Decrees requiring reform of police
practices.
W9 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1995). For a discussion of the implementation of die Act by the De-
partment ofJustice, see Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Strudural Reform Litigatzon: Dtpulsng P-
vate Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rig"s, 100 COLU.M. L REV. 1384 (2000); Debra Lvingston,
Police Reform and the Department ofJustice: An Essay on Acrountabdit, 2 Bn'FF. CGIm. L REv. 815
(1999); Marshall Miller, Note, Police Bntalit, 17 YALE L & POLY' REv. 149 (1998).
11vingston, supra note 389, at 841-850.SId at 815416.
See infra note 395 and accompanying text.s93 Id.
3% Livingston, supra note 389, at 815-16. The federal government (as well as local prosecu-
tors) may bring criminal prosecutions against police officers who violate or conspire to violate
civil rights. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1994). However, these criminal statutes require the gov-
ernment to prove a specific intent to deprive the victim of a constitutional right, Unted States v.
Guest 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966), a factor that the Department ofJustice often cites in refizng to
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The Department of Justice and private litigators have crafted con-
sent decrees and other settlement agreements that mandate sweeping
structural and institutional reforms. 9 These settlements and consent
decrees require police departments to collect and maintain a wide
range of information (in computerized form) that is critical to the ef-
fective internal management of departments and to external moni-
toring of abuse and corruption issues. Properly designed and im-
plemented, these monitoring systems have the potential for
remedying misconduct in the same way that COMPSTAT systems
have helped police recognize patterns of criminal conduct.3 96 In the
area of racial profiling, the decrees mandate that race not be consid-
ered in a decision to stop or search (unless the police are acting on a
specific description) and that in all stops, searches, and arrests, the
department record and maintain information as to the race of the
suspect and the reasons for the police action. 97 Further, departments
are required to computerize their record-keeping operations in a
manner that creates accessible fields of relevant information.39
Police departments are also mandated to initiate early warning
systems to alert Commanders and outside monitors of troublesome
trends or performances before they become acutely dangerous to the
public.5 " Officers who are involved in a disproportionate number of
prosecute police officers. But even without this difficult burden of proof it is unlikely we would
see many more prosecutions. Prosecutors do not embrace the prosecution of fellow law en-
forcement officers and even when they are motivated to act, the code of silence within most
departments and jury sympathy for police officers may make the prosecution highly problem-
atic. In the area of stops and searches, unless the incident escalates into the use of deadly force,
the significance of any one case will be relatively minor, thus presenting an additional reason
for federal officials to pass on criminal prosecution.
395 E.g., Settlement and Monitoring Agreement and Stipulations of the Parties, NAACP v. City
of Philadelphia, supra note 388; Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, CA. No
97354 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Consent Decree, United States v. State of New Jersey, CA. No. 99-5970
(D.N.J. 1999); Memorandum of Agreement Between United States Department of Justice and
Montgomery County, Md., et al.,Jan. 18, 2000. Much of the incentive for change resulted from
unconscionable acts of brutality and corruption, including the Rodney King beating, the shoot-
ing of Amadou Diallo and the brutalization of Abner Louima in New York, the massive corrup-
tion and misconduct scandals in the New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, and New
Orleans Police Departments, and the growing sentiment and expressions of resentment and
anger in minority communities over the day to day practices and policies of police agencies.
And, as recent events powerfully demonstrate, pervasive corruption and misconduct continues
in some departments. E.g., CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION, supra note 228; MOLLEN COMMISSION,
supra note 228; Settlement and Monitoring Agreement and Stipulations of the Parties, NAACP
v. City of Philadelphia, supra note 395; INTERIM REPORT OF ATrORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY,
supra note 32; REPORT OFATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEWYORK, supra note 46; Todd S. Purdum, Los
Angeles Police Officer Sets off Corruption Scanda N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1999 at A9 (describing larg-
est corruption scandal in 60 years, involving framing of defendants); James Sterngold, Police
Corruption Inquiry Expands in Los Angeles N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, § 1, at 16.
See BRAlTON & KNOBLER, supra note 76, at 233-239.
$97 Consent Decree, United States v. NewJersey, supra note 395; Memorandum of Agreement
Between the United States Department ofJustice and Montgomery County, Md., United States
v. Montgomery County, supra note 395.
398 See supra note 395.
Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, supra note 395, at 6-9.
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questionable stops or searches, use of force, or other discretionary
conduct, or who are the subject of repeated civilian complaints, can
be identified and counseled and re-trained even before disciplinary
action may be warranted. The consent decrees require departments
to ensure the integrity and fairness of internal affairs investigations
into civilian complaints./°
The New Jersey Turnpike Agreement prohibits troopers from
considering the race, nationality, or ethnicity of motorists or passen-
gers in determining which vehicles to stop or in "enforcement action
or procedure" (e.g., searches), unless race or national or ethnic ori-
gin was part of a description of a suspect' To effectuate this policy,
the Consent Decree requires officers to record data on motor vehicle
stops, including the gender and race or ethnicity of the driver and
any passenger who was the subject of a "procedure," and the reason
for the stop and any search resulting from the stop." Further, super-
visors must review troopers' reports on stops and may also review the
corresponding audio/visual tapes." ' When such review reveals a pos-
sible violation of the provisions of the decree or shortcomings in
meeting the reporting or recording requirements, "nondisciplinary"
action such as counseling or more training may be ordered. "'
NewJersey is also required to develop a "Management Awareness
Program" that uses the data collected by troopers, the results of inves-
tigations, and other sources to "identify and modify potentially prob-
lematic behavior" by troopers." Data analyses tunder the MAP must
include:
[A] comparison of racial/ethnic percentages of motor vehicle stops (by
reason for the stop... ) and racial/ethnic percentages of enforcement
actions and procedures taken in connection ith or during the course of
such stops, with a benchmark racial/ethnic percentage if aailable;
[A] comparison of racial/ethnic percentages for such stops ith the ra-
cial/ethnic percentages for enforcement actions taken in connection
with or during the course of such stops;
4 Id 23-33
401 Consent Decree, United States v. State of Newjersey, supra note 393.
4 There are significant limitations on consent searches: state troopers may request consent
to search a motor vehicle only where troopers can articulate a reasonable suspicion that a
search would reveal evidence of a crime; every consent search of a vehide must be based on
written consent of the driver or other person authorized to give consent which precedes the
search; the scope of the consent is limited to the scope of the consent that is given by the driver
or other person authorized to give consent; the driver or other person authorized to give con-
sent is advised of such right; that the driver or other person authorized to give consent tho has
granted written consent may orally withdraw that consent at any time during the search ithout
giving a reason; and state troopers immediately must stop a consent search of a vehicle if and
when consent is withdrawn. Id. These provisions are more restrictive than Fourth Amendment
doctrine. See, &g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (searches under Fourth Amend-
ment must be reasonably based on the totality of the circumstances).
Consent Decree, United States v. State of NewJersey, supra note 395. at 18-24.
04 Id. at 23-33 .
Consent Decree, United States v. State of NewJersey. supra note 395. at 18-23.
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[A] comparison of racial/ethnic percentages for consent searches of ve-
hicles, and requests for consent to search vehicles, with "find" rates by
race/ethnicity for motor vehicle consent searches;
[A] comparison of racial/ethnic percentages for non-consensual
searches of motor vehicles with "find rates" by race/ethnicity for motor
vehicle non-consensual searches.0
The New Jersey Decree does not remedy all problems (for exam-
ple, it does not prohibit pretextual stops), but if fully implemented it
has the very strong potential of ending racial profiling on the New
Jersey Turnpike. The combination of detailed data collection and
analysis, limits on consent searches, and mandatory internal and ex-
ternal audits provide powerful tools for reform.0 7
The Philadelphia Police Department Agreement covers a broader
range of police practices. Among other provisions, it requires (1)
computerization of standard police paperwork and all information
relating to citizen complaints, use of force, firearms discharges, and
other police activities that may disclose misconduct in a format that
permits retrieval of information by officer, district, special squads,
and category of police work,"8 (2) close reviews and audits of narcot-
ics officers, including their applications for search warrants, "find"
rates and use of force during searches, surveillance records, and use
of informants,4" (3) a substantial reform of the procedures of the In-
ternal Affairs Division,4 0 (4) accountability of supervisors for the pre-
ventable misconduct of police officials, and (5) procedures and
policies to counter racial bias in policing.1 On this last issue, the
Agreement provides:
A. [S]pecific and detailed training with respect to equal treatment of
citizens [and] promulgation of disciplinary regulation[s] for racially bi-
ased police work.
B. A Deputy Commissioner [must] (1) monitor police records and
complaints as they involve minorities and allegations of racial discrimina-
tion, (2) act as a liaison to representatives of minority communities and
to officials in the Department dealing with race related issues, and (3)
406 Id. at 21.
407 Without a prohibition on pretextual stops, law enforcement agencies can continue to pro-
file by race, and attempt to "even out" the statistics by stopping sufficient numbers of white
drivers.
408 Settlement Agreement, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, supra note 395, at 2; City of Phila-
delphia's Response to Plaintiffs' Proposals for Reforms Within the Philadelphia Police Depart-
ment, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, CA. No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa. 1996), at 7-8 (on file with
author).
4W Settlement Agreement, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, supra note 395, at 3-4; City of
Philadelphia's Response to Plaintiffs' Proposals, supra note 408, at 16-20.
410 Settlement Agreement, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, supra note 395, at 2; City of Phila-
delphia's Response to Plaintiffs' Proposals, supra note 408, at 3-6.Settlement Agreement, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, supra note 395, at 2; City of Phila-
delphia's Response to Plaintiffs' Proposals, supra note 408, at 3-6.
, Settlement Agreement, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, supra note 395, at 2; City of Phila-
delphia's Response to Plaintiffs' Proposals, supra note 408, at 21-29.
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monitor programs with respect to hiring and promotion of minorities.
C. [P]edestrian and vehicle stops [are to] be recorded ... even if the
stop does not yield information, detention, evidence or an arrest. Each
document must state the reason for the stop, for any police action taken
(e.g., frisk, search, questioning), and the race of the person(s) stopped.
[A] review and audit, on a regular basis, [of] the patterns of these
stops to determine whether impermissible racial factors are involved. In-
dividuals identified on the police reports, but against whom no charges
have been made, should be contacted on a random basis to determine if
the police conduct was justified and to examine any possible racial pat-
terns.
D. Individual officers' and supervisors' files (as computerized)
should contain any allegations or findings of racial bias. In addition, the
records of stops, searches, arrest and civilian complaints in the files
should be periodically reviewed to determine whether racial bias or pat-
terns are evident
413
V. THE ELEMENTS OF REFOR-M
Three developments have converged in the past few years with the
distinct potential of altering the legal and political landscape of con-
temporary policing practices. First, there is almost universal con-
demonation of "racial profiling" and, while the debate as to the proper
definition of this term will continue, there is growing support for the
principle that race cannot be used to any degree to support a discre-
tionaryjudgment by a police officer to stop, frisk, or search a suspect,
except where a description of a suspect has been provided. Police
departments will be pressed to adopt and implement policies prohib-
iting racial profiling and the courts are likely to intervene where pat-
terns of racial profiling are proven.
Second, for the first time, reliable data are being collected and
analyzed with respect to both racial disparities in stops and searches
and whether adequate cause exists for the police intrusions. These
data are essential to any serious effort to reconsider constitutional
doctrine and to address the remedies necessary for racial profiling
and other arbitrary police conduct.
Third, effective judicial remedial measures that reflect a more
progressive police management philosophy have been adopted and,
if properly implemented, hold the promise for significant ameliora-
tion of past abuses. Notwithstanding the serious obstacles that make
federal injunctive relief far too problematical, strong pleadings and
evidentiary showings have resulted in some preliminary adjudications
sustaining complaints, certifying class actions, and permitting discov-
ery of critical police department records. Further, the Department of
Justice has begun to exercise its powers to litigate pattern and prac-
413 Fourth Philadelphia Report, supm note 41, at 3.
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tice cases of police misconduct and the Department as entered into a
number of state of the art consent decrees.
These developments create the potential for bridging the enor-
mous gap between the promises of the Constitution and the realities
of street level policing. Ultimately, the abuses will be significantly re-
duced only where there are fundamental reforms in police policies
and practices. The following are essential elements of a reform
agenda.
A. Legislative and Administrative Measures
" Racial profiling should be prohibited. Race should not be a
permissible factor in the discretionary decision to stop, search,
or arrest, unless the police have specific descriptive racial in-
formation concerning a suspect.
" Law enforcement agencies should be mandated by law to col-
lect, maintain, and report all relevant data concerning the
race of persons stopped and searched, the legal cause for traf-
fic and pedestrian stops and searches, and all relevant circum-
stances surrounding the stop (e.g., requests for consent, use of
narcotics dogs, use of force). The provisions of the pending
federal legislation on traffic stop statistics and the terms of the
Consent Decrees entered into by the Department of Justice
and State of NewJersey should provide models for legislatures
and law enforcement agencies.
" Analysis of these data should include a comparison of all rele-
vant categories of racial/ethnic percentages for car stops and
searches and of all police investigatory methods used during
these stops (with a benchmark racial/ethnic percentage if
available).
" Analysis of data concerning pedestrian stops should include
the same types of racial/ethnic comparisons for stops, frisks,
and searches. Audits should be performed to determine
whether stops are being made with adequate cause.
* Pretextual stops should be prohibited. Traffic stops should be
made only for observed traffic violations or where adequate
cause supports a criminal investigatory stop. The decision to
stop should be made independent of race and should not be
made on the mere suspicion of drug possession.
" In all circumstances in which consent to search is requested,
the person should be informed of her right to refuse consent.
All consent requests should be recorded, and all consents
should be in writing and signed by the driver, passenger, or
pedestrian who was stopped.
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B. Doctrinal Refon
" The Fourth Amendment should be construed to prohibit pre-
textual stops based on the race of the "suspect."
* Statistical evidence of significant racial disparities in stops and
searches (controlled for relevant non-racial factors) should be
sufficient to state a prima facie case of Fourteenth Amend-
ment and Title VI claims of race discrimination.
" Constitutional standing principles for raising constitutional
claims of racial discrimination and for lack of cause of stops
and searches should be adjusted to permit federal la suits
where patterns or practices of unconstitutional conduct are al-
leged and where plaintiffs have been subjected to the com-
plained-of practices.
" An evidentiary showing of significant numbers of stops without
legal justification should provide grounds for class monetary
and injunctive relief.
" Discovery rules in criminal procedure proceedings should be
substantially broadened to require disclosure of pattern and
practice evidence.
" Where categories of conduct that have been recognized as
permissible grounds for an investigative stop are demon-
strated by empirical evidence to result in extremely low rates
of determined criminal conduct, the Court should reconsider
the Fourth Amendment standards associated with this con-
duct.
C. Enforcement
" The Department of Justice should vigorously investigate and
litigate pattern and practice police misconduct and should
continue to draft and implement consent decrees that ad-
vance "best practices" and which effectively control unconsti-
tutional practices.
" Police Departments should ensure that their Internal Affairs
Unit conduct investigations of police misconduct ith impar-
tiality, integrity, and with the necessary resources. There
should be "early warning systems" capable of detecting pat-
terns of misconduct by individual officers or units within the
Department. Supervisors should be held accountable for pre-
ventable misconduct of line officers.
" Civilian review should be established to ensure competent and
vigorous external oversight of allegations of individual and in-
stitutional (pattern and practice) misconduct.
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Policing by racial stereotypes and by serendipity has long been the
norm in too many locations. The challenge to these long established
practices must be multi-faceted and include political, administrative,
and legal reform. The integrity of the constitutional framework
hangs in the balance.
